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The coal industry in Belgium is a sick industry
ant a olitical problem, 'elgi an government hand
in hand with thv , .uthority of orcpear Coal
and Steel oifcS have goi Berate the
ai
-
rough prote j .-.erasures* But, in the
final analysis, the su_ '.. of Coal In I LuiB hinges
on ehe solution oi lens: the high cost of
production, and competition from cheaper coal imports
and other energy sources*
e Belgian cool industry is the oldesl: . he
continent of Burope* At 0:10 time* it was the "anchor
1
of the Belgian economy*" Coal was first extra,? ted
from the Charlcrci basin in the thirteenth century*
The Hainaue nines wers first worked in .Bio asvanteeni
century* with some coal being ex? or". France and
Holland* B3 . Be end of the eighteenth century* the
Liege coal industry was /ancad on fcha Con-
oinent*
1* F* Gunther Eyck* ,! Benelux in the Common






2* ?. Gunther Eyck, the Benelux Countries * An
Historical Purvey (?ri:." . .> »*J#1 B* Tan forstr -
Company, 1959), p* 94* (Hereafter cited as )•
•3* lB| Belgium (Berkeley ^ Gal-




In 1781, Jaraes Vaatt convi . r\,ed reciprocal motion
of une Piston into rotary motion which made the steam
engine a practical prime uover for all kinds of
4
machinery* '-.he Scotsman's invention helped usher in
the industrial Revolution, It was a boon for the coal
industry* By 1769, the production of steam engines
5
had created a large demand for coal and iron*
- ;h rich deposits of coal and iron ore,
Belgium very quickly was caught up In the Industrial
Revolution* She was not only the first to industrial-
ize on the Continent, but also became the most high«
ly industrialised* 6
In 1815, after %b» Napoleonic '.»ars, the Congress
of Vienna merged Belgium and th© Netherlands into a
single kingdom* In reworking the map of Europe, the
Congress also took some of Prance's best; working mines
7
and lumped them into this new political entity* The
Belgians were not happy with this unionj however, 6heir
industries continued to flourish* The substitution of
coke for charcoal (made from wood) in the iron making
4* Henry W* Littlefleld, History of Europe Since
1815 (Ti ion; Kew York J Barnes" ana Noble,
1959), pp. 4-5.
5* Lav id Thompson, Burop© Since Bapoleon (Second* * mill i immiUllMHiii «« *!, »*.. nw —mmi-mmi i»i«miwii>mwhmmp
coition; Hew York J Alfred A . Knopf , 1962 ) , pp . 95-96
•
6. F* Lee Benns, European Bistpry Since 1870
(Second Edition: Kev: Yojpk* F»S. Crof ta, ar-d Co., 1947)*
7« Thompson, oo. c i t: # , p* 140*

process in bh© Lie. .naufe regions sharply in-
creased the demand for coal*
By 1630 # coal . oad burgeoned to such an
extent that sosie col-. .ployed several ; ed
workers, an unusual situation in the in/, g of the
, ' 9 12 , 000
hp of steata force in Belgiumj the lion f s share - 10,000
hp « was atillaad at the coal mines* -he remainder
3
was spread cut among other . .os» Goal production
9
in Belgium soarea 'co nearly sin million tons i illy.
rh$ time was now ripe for jhe Belgians to re-
volt against the Dutch* Shey declared their independ-
ence on 28 October 1331* Thereafter i @ "rich
supplies of coal and a spirit of national enterprise",
Bei
:
such o headway - soon her de-
gree oi Industrialization was comparable to that of
Great Britain. Their industrial growth kept pace
10
with the British until the 1860s* "By 1370, Belgium
had become the most densely populated country in Europe
and as intensely industrialized as its British exemplar,"
8* Goris, jag* cit.
, p* 174*
9* /son, op , cit *. p* 140*
10 • ISM** PP*"i58i''""fe"35*
11* i'erdinan^ ylX3 > B ills tor:; of ./.trope from
.
Reformation uo ohe pres ent, Ba;y (aew :_crl;: Hare ourt,




The Belgians inaugurated a railway building
program in 1834 which gave even greater impetus to
the modernization and ©scansion of the coal mining
12
industry. By 1875, the Belgian railway network was
the densest in the world. It was again necessary to
step up and expand coal production to meet the re-
13
quirements of this great complex*
Around 1870-1880, the iron ore reserves in
Belgium were exhausted. Zven coal production lagged
behind the needs of the nation. Quantities of lignite*
anthracite, and coke had to be imported. Other raw
materials and semi-fiuished goods were imported. Hence-
forth Belgium "became a manufacturing and exporting
14
country."
Belgian territory became a battlefield during
World V,ar I and was subject to a great devastation* The
country* a economy was virtually leveled. From 1914
to 1918, ihe conquering Germans dismantled complete
factories and shipped them in toto to Germany. Raw ma-
terials ant l&rr,e quantities of machinery were also re*
quisitloned. The retreating German army was prepared
to completely destroy the Belgian coal mines to prevent
12. Cor is, out olt .a p. 176.
13. Eyck, o£. cit « 9 p. 96} Goris, jop. cit
i
» ,tt p.177,
14. Goris, 0£. c I t p. 177; Syekj QP . Cit.< p.97.
- 4 -

their use by the advancing Allies* However* this plan




Economic recovery after World War I was rapid,
thin six years after the end of the war* most of the in-
dustries ware restored. Qn«i beneficial outcome of the hor-
rible War was the formation of the Itelgium-Luxembourg
Union (BLUU) in 1922. Prior to World i'iar I* Luxembourg was
part of the German Zollvercin. Under this arrangement * the
Ruhr «nta he main source of coal and coke for the steel in-
dustries cf the Grand Duchy* The Treaty of Versailles broke
up the Zollverein, thus making way for the formation of
i "thin the framewcrk of BLEU, Belgian coal and coke
took the place of German coalf however, its terms did not
restrict inp orts of coal from third countries, or imports
from third countries passing across the common border.
By 1926, the Belgian franc was stabilized, and
increased industrial investment and economic stability
16
were made possible. The initial payments of German
reparations to Belgium, as agreed upon at the Spa Con-
17
feronce, aided considerably in the industrial restoration*
15. Thompson, _ou. cit *. p. 541. Goris, og» cit .
,
p* 101.
16. Eyck, op . cit. « p. 97; Thompson, gjd. cit ..* p. 61 9.
17. 3t*Hf Carr, International Relations ^e. oT/een
the Two World wars (1910-1050) (London: &'aomlllan..and
Company, 1961) p. 54. "Belgium in view of the special sever-
ity of her sufferings, saa to have priority up to the
amount} of E 100, 000 ,"000. n

Expansion of industry i urn continue a until the
depression 01 i,he 1930s*
_j?ing this period of expansion, the coal min*»
Ing industry was entirely mechanized, and tmvi nines
wore opened in the Kemp.in (Campine) basin* -he annual
coal procuction figure in 1915 was 22,800,000 metric
tons. ~he Campine coal fields 6 -tially
the industrialisation of the flemish area ' . I . had
18
been predominantly agrarian*
respite modernization and expansion, fctaa coal
output during the I it«n**waf period fell short of do-
mestic needs* ffc brid \ 4s enerry gap, la*ge quan-
tities of coal had to be imported* From 1931 on 3 Bel-
gium, which had virtually been a free trade arer. 3 <
forced to extend protective measures to the coal min-
ing ' ry, Belgium remr.ive'% however, in The 19S0s




The Belgian coal industry desired ,o further
protect its products against foreign compe -.i by
exercising control over bhfl Belgian coal -arket.
April 1929, the Societo Oenaraie and <jhe Banque de
1&4 i ££• cit*< pp. 188~18!5»
19, Ibid#, ' p. 18§, i85j Eyck, o£. cit # , pp. B2 ;
98,

Eruxelles founded the Gomptolr B«lg« des Oharbona
us Uriels. RThii agency centralised the sale of
coal to industry and „t .ion and importation
of industrial coal/' it of a total production figure
of 36 million tons of coal annually* Comptoir Beige
des Charbons Indus triels handled sale of 3 million
tons* fhli agency functioned until 1C?S4# when the
government - with wfaoffi it had differences * wrestled
control from it over production* sales and imports
until 193C« .he government announced its cefcermina*
tion to control the industry fe| decree* Ithla the
framework laid down by the government, in . .:,:.::ber 1934,
the producers formed a cooperative oall« t£i . u^ion-
al ces Charbons "to control production* ass: .reduct-
ion quotas* regulate prices and i
.. I a orate* ».*and
exclusive control over sales to major public and private
consumers and to foreign customers*" Per coke* an
agency, Oflice Beige des Cokes* with similar functions
20
was formed in 1957*
History grimly repeated itself 1- „340 when
Germany a^ain Invac . ei^iunw Liberation di . com©
about until 3 September 1944* In the interim, the
20« Louis Lirter, turnoc T n Coal ?nC ."t-^el £._
munit;s « Hew York: h .:.'.. n unelj 1960, p# 278,
- 7

trauma conducted another "economic r. n raw mate*
rials" 8 adustry. lar^e quam-ities 01 c'al
were removed for use fry ".'.he German war e
Belgian schools had to be close the I? for
21
laoK of fuel*






I. CuAL MIKiNC? C IOHS
Before considering po3t-V*'orlO. l-ar II recovery
and the problems of into -.ion into the European
Coal and Steel Community, It would be worthwhile
reviewing the conditions that prevail in the coal
mining Incur try of Belgium.
'ihe coal mining industry is a particularly impor-
tant sector of the Belgian economy* In 1055, approxi-
mately 10 percent of the Belgian labor force worked
in this industry. The coal Industry also accounted for
at least IS percent of all goods produced* ..he profit-
making capacity of the collieries had a considerable
1
impact on the economic situation In Belgium* Only in
the Saar was the coal mining Industry more important*
The Belgian collieries are usually divided into
two r-roups. The first is the Campine Basin* It is loca-
ted in the northeast section of Belgium and stretches lite
the Limburg area of the Netherlands* and taen on in -co
the Aachen Basin of the. German Federal Republic. There
1* -J." . rsj £_^1 Z. i z3£




are seven pits operating in the Cooiplne*
. second p m the oldest in Europe « is the
Southern Belt &?* of which is
ord et fa*-de~Calais coal field of France. In
195-3, 136 .re extracting coal fron the jfto
2
fc&in* m ! a southern coal field is made
up of four districts: Centre, Charlcroi, .^orinage,
and J. , -ho ..iost e: 3fi to onerav: .re in
5
the Liege and . ots«
Figure 1 shows the loc of these groups*
. the j pine - whieb started
producing in 1917 - tfl \,he largest and r 2 modern*
-he C alpine pits had an average annual output In Febru-
4
ary 1953 of 1»4 s&llioa a tit* By 1957|
thu average annual outp .creased to 1.5 million
5
»rie tons £©1? pit*
The 0, has lar -servos. Bevel*
lent of new mines in this area had been postponed
olgian government, " »e of pa: mtary pole*
;s over nationalization of the ooal mini' >y»
2, Ibid » > p. 239.













In 1957* concessions were granted to open new pits J
however # no action has been taken because of the de-
6
cline in demand for coal.
Coal deposits v^ore first discovered" in the Csraplne
in 1901, e B&fixs is approximately 50C square miles
in area« riveys itt of the
expl-. ie reserves" in the J^asia are to be found at
depths below 3000 feet. deepest shaft is at Zwart-
ber£> Thii start :pth of 3,314 feet and
7
took over four years bo complete*
At the Dutch border, the depth of the seams is
approximately 1400 feet* As the Basin extends Vts1
8
word th«= B©8£ia !m in depth*
The task of developing these shafts was extremely
long and cost o to deposits of sar ravel
i;Lich wore usually water soaked* The first mines in
this area did not become ooerational until 1917, because
9
of the First World "'ar»
; collieries in iouth Belgium are s: '. snd old.
«n BelgiiM jsl omrion Market, equipment in
C>» Ibid** "°« H7«e « ±pxp p J.J.7.
7« Francie J* Ko u>e, A Regional Geography of
Western .Jurope (New York* J iley ?nd. sS&EJ iiSJV*
1961},' pp7"121-122
«
B« '. ""man (ed« i A j .,o raphy o£ iUiropjs
Including ts-i^io U«S*S«R. (Se< ItTonj r~ rhe""
Hon is j . - ;
9. Honkhouse, oo » cit « , f>« IF-- i
12 -

these pits v;as antiquated, and the average annual pit
output -- - ISCj " f - m fta, whi<
was the lowest output in the Community. Conditions,
- Ut thi :fcu
10
Perhaps the bleakest outlook wag In the Borinage district.
Southern I aes centered around Liege | Namur.,
and Charier oi serre as a base f cr the Belgian steel ir.dus-
11
try. -'here are no ste-. .n the Camnine* In
the Borinage* coal wtfttng is presently the only industry*
The Liege district produces - titles of anthra-
cite coal. Its economic outlook is good, because it
12
is one of the few producers of anthracite in the world.
Many of the aeams i a southern coal field are
shattered to the point where the coal must be briquetted
or "burnt in situ for underground gasification, The
fractured seams hinder mechanisation! and fire-damp is
prevalent, contributing to a very high accident rate."
13
At SIona| fehi mines generally exceed 3,300 feet.
i'he coal reserves in Belgium in 1955 were estimated
at about 2.8 billion metric tons. At the present rate of
10. !e, o£. cit., p. 289.
jl.^.. l.u£ uCTj j^ m G x v » , po .Jo.
12. J. Ruasex Smith and others, industrial and
Commercial Geography (fourth editions i'ew York; Eenry
Holt and Co., 1355 } , p. 235.




production^ these reserves should last about 100 years.
The coal mining conditions In Europe - and espe-
cially in Belgium * are adverse* Mines are deo'p and
susceptible to flooding* Such natural conditions (and
others listed in Tabl«3 1.) make it difficult to close
down vjines without the possibility of losing reserves*
Therefore, che European coal industry has less flexi-
bility in adjusting to the business cycle*
Table 1 effectively describes the predicament of
the coal nines in Europe duri ._s late 1040s and
early 1350s« Most American bituminous nines, in com-
parison;, are only 400 feet deep*
TABLE It
TYPICAL MINING CONDITIONS IN SELECT i) COAL PRODUCING COUNTRIES 12
Condition Belgium France Ruhr Netherlands
Depth (feet) 2,625 1,465 2,480 1300 - 1800
Seam Thickness (feet) 2-2/3 4-5/3 4-1/3 3-1/2
Gradient Steep 20 to 40
degrees
Steep Moderate
Faulting Much Much Much Moderate
Roof and Floor Moderate Moderate Moderate Poor roof
5
Moderate floor
Friability Soft Soft Hard — -
a* In southern Belgium the seams are thin, the mines gassy and
wot, the roof weak and the floor heaving; average depth in
the Campine is 2,739 feet.
Because of the harsh conditions reflected in the
above Table 1, mining these seams in southern Belgium
14. Hoffman, j^d, cLt ., p# 350»
15« Lister, .o£* cit «j p. 94»
- 14

results in high production costs* Most of these mines
have passed their peak. :,he other hand* the seams
in the Campine are less faulted than those in the south*
16
and are also flatter and t>« Productivity in the
Campine Basin is high, the average annual output per
mire in the Gemplne ther region in
the Community* Most of the southern Belgian mines
operated at a loss until i&fl were Introduced*
In coal mining, "thicker coal seams are easier to
mine up to a point" and are "more adaptable to nechani-
sation." As the seam thicknesses fall to below four
or five feet, difficulties in mining increase* The
method most commonly used in Europe is long-wall mining*
n permits full productive operations
to begin after comparitively little development*" This
modus operandi saves eoalj however* it requires more
labor per ion* her extractions are possible, and its
use is more in line with the si life of reserves* Often
the choice in x^urope is between deepening an existing
mine or opening a new one that is deeper* In o;rly
1950, bha output per man-shift ,' underground and surface
workers combined) tn American un ound bituminous
mines was "more than eight times greater than that in
17
the Belgian Goal mines*"
1C* Ibid.* p. 100
•
17* " xTd., op. 94- 97.
15 -

Because of the Inherent weaknesses of the coal
Indus try* it was necor ary that the Belgian government
formulate new policies designed to improve the com-
petitive strength of her collieries before joining the
CocimuniuV. In order to do this* the Belgian government
Look zhe foilwin i
« Paid subsidies tv cover working losses and to
stimulate modernization and re-equipment*
» Encouraged amalgamation and closing down of
18
leas efficient pits. e moves and their results
will be discus sed in later sections*
II. fCSl-IVAR RECOVERY (1944-1952)
The end of World Y.&r II found Belgium in a rela-
tively good financial position* Post-war recovery*
therefore*was rapid and impressive* Yet* the Belgian
collieries were not ready to integrate into thy Common
rket on 10 February 1955 when the ECSC Treaty for
coal case into effect.
iring World V/ar II* I \m had lost or.ly 4 per-
cent (EYok states 6 to 8 percent) of her national wealth*
La loss was a fraction of that lost during the First
World War* The primary reasons for this small loss
in capital wealth arei
. in » i HI i »«. . i m.l l
l*7 • Ibid, i pp. 04-97
Ifj* Meade* op « cit «< p* 2 91*
- 16 -

i During Hie war, the Belgian Congo continued to
earn foreign exchange
«
• After the libort? oil on on 3 September 1944,
Belgium became an important base for Ame^lcaft and Brit*
ish troops. Largs sums of foreign exchange were earned
from thlj souret
,
rJhe port of Antwerp becane the busiest port on
the continent of Europe.
Although her loss of national wealth r;as minimal,
the picture in Belgium was ftttf from rosy at the end
of the war* She was beae mm3 shortages of
transportation, fuel, raw materials, and food*
the currency was It :"lated. I -wis 60,000 Belgians
were prisoners outside i _igium, 3*000
20
workers I ?.'.' tro v;ork ?.:. ries»
The Belgian go? rnment could not tackle all these
problems at once. fe« first step it took was to sta-
bilise the Belgian franc, in er 194/i, the old
currency was replaced 3 B 3 ;:s with other etrin-
gent r;casa ;e£, the currency was stabilized and the
21
inflationary spiral was chec. ed. is successful anti*
inf loi " : ell for the 3 , every
20. Shepard 5. Clou tries •'•', Cole, Economic
History of Europe (Third eeitionJ Boston 2 D.C. lieatlT"
and Co,, 195&), o. 775.
81. Ibid., p. 7 7-_.
- 17 -

program that folio ! ' *el£«
Dollar ar e verves increased rapidly in
the wake o:- currency ref . i that
s forced a cutbaol 3 i tse a-*
flowing trtm . ' L$ed states t<, ; ; osNift|
was inc eial aasletanoe (un&W
reverse.' lonr. -lease) tv i
g
"Ittlos
ov -:re. Indeed, -.,?. tmi<£u§ anong the na-




more she r> e«ivod v l;-, -a-v>i8 the Cfolfeed 3tafces»
In r 8«
^
a y of 1945*
lend-lease oreCIt arranger ! recovery were negotia-
~25
ted f oj* llXlon 'to be Waited _a»
Belgian gold reserves were dv:ir.
,
aft s -'-6.
This 3e ;; acl: atemed froE glum* a unf avcral '




ftl and ispwtafcian h " ! extern
European recovery. Goal pr>. fl nest of
the transpiration . rubble. In July
22. Eyokj ,QD* - « 102-103*
23* 'Villi * >wn anc Hedvers '--pie, /merioan
Fore. ce (Washli ton* D*G*3 Brookings institute,
1955), :-•• 70.
24 • St .arose 9 economic Planning for Peace
(Prince son II. J • i Princeton University Press, 19537, P« 359,
- I. m

1945, the European Coal Orga. ion (ECO) was set up
to e provide the much needed
coal* A t5ne, ian coal production - about
25
57 peree 1, to allevi; mt
sho:- 9, an em--- r.aal \ :'n~
d-j $ ; d alloc :•".:. accordance :ed
needs*
o baric in ous fuel ava' untitles
in Western inrope i :: ~oal # Fuel production had been
seriously Impaired by &n b©< .at
together with a shortage ef ;iiners and pit props, made
the problem of supply > It* in-
other s ' " • al
produ re fe which persi: il
after 1646* Th< physical oxsrtlon. requ: 3 in
26
coal for a roll-fed vrorls force*
The picture, then, was not good* What made it
verse nc at! in the : 'any of the better
8sans hac been worked out, and it beoesie necessary to
go deeper* ^ese aen ?ca::? were thl., 1*
Working conditions wero bad and sometimes hazardous*
The shafts mp$ 8 f the £ bo





ong and j eneral W 1?. ( i'/ashingtoa,
D*C« : Brookings Institute^ 1957), p» 174.
26. Penrose, » t»




















out of water in the new environment.
Post-war recovery in Europe moved f orv.ard until
the Qnd of 1946 when domestic stockpiles of coal were
depleted* Expansion came to a halt* The unusually
severe winters of 1946-47, the fuel shortage, and shor-
tage of industrial raw materials from abroad were con-*
tributory factors* -he United States became alarmed over
the grim economic situation in Europe* In June 1947,
General George Marshall set forth his broad plan for
European recovery based on their own cooperation and
initiative* Xa April 1948, the Convention for Euro-
pean Economic Cooperation was signed by sixteen Euro-
pean countries, Belgium included* The Organization for
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was set up and
economic recovery began anew*
Under the OEEC*s 1948-1949 program, the European
coal industry was to increase its production* with U.S.
aid, by an estimated IS percent* Production was to b©
29
"the touchstone of economic recovery* 11 Belgian increases
in coal production fell short of this mark* In fact,
production increaced less than 10 percent in 1948, and
slightly over 4 percent in 1949 (See Table 2 for other
28. Ibid., P* 202.
29* Bayard P. Price. I1he Marshall Plan and its Meaning
(Ithica, N«Y*: Cornell University Press, 1955), pp. 94-95*
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productivity data) In 1939* the daily output per man
had been 1.25 metric tons. In 1949$ the output in com**
30
parison was a disappointing 1.02 metric tons*
The European Payments union (EPU) was created with*
in OEEC, and had its first year of operation in 1950™
1951* The EPU agreement
•••provided for a fully automatic multi-
lateral system that would permit each part*
icipant to offset its deficit with any
member against its surplus with other
members, so that each country would need to
be concerned only with its balance of pay*
mentis with the rest of free liurope as a
whole, and not its balance with any single
member of the union.31
Belgium was considered to foe a prospective creditor
nation under EPU, and therefore was assigned an "initial
debit balance", which represented transfer of prospec*
tive surplus materials to ERJ. Belgium received "cor**
ditional aid" for these materials as part of the EGA
32
dollar allocation. Belgium did in fact become an.
extreme creditor nation.
From 1947 on, the Belgian government initiated
a program of subsidies, grants-in-aid for investment
and re-equipment to improve coal productivity.
Belgium, because of her favorable financial posi-
tion, did not receive American aid. Marshall Plan
30, Smith, o£. Clt.« p. 292,
31. Price, Q£» cit ., p. 143.




1. Total net output (1,000 tons)
2. Total number of underground
miners on books
3. Number of working days underground
a) days of extraction
b) days of non-extraction
c) total (a + b)
4. Output per worker underground
per year (tons)
5. Average number of days worked per
year by underground worker on books
a) during days of extraction
(3(a) -r 8)
b) during days of non-
extraction (3(b) + 2)
o) total (3(c) + 2)
6. Output per underground worker on books
per working day (1 + 3(c)) (kgs.)

















27,805,776 29 ,836,827 29 ,528,306
434,279 523,370 500,893
















33. 0EEC, Coal Production and Supplies for Western V.urope in 1952 and
195G: Second Genoral Report of the Mini sterial Coal Production Group, 1953






























financial aid to clglum took the form of "conditional
aid" rather jrants. This aid served to stimu~
late needed investments and export trade. Nearly 80
percent of the counterpart funds were put into the
coal industry as investments* This amounted to over
£24 million from April 1948 until the end of 1956* In-
vestments per ton rose from Bfr 57.7 in 1949 to Bfr
54
96.28 in 1952.
It would seen that the Belgian government had
initiated a crash financial program to improve the
coal industry in anticipation of entering the Common
Market for coal in 195S» This late start and high
rate of investment did litLie to solve the problems of
the Belgian coal industry* because of insufficient
government control of the program. As Price states the
problems
The benefits of (financial) stability
were to some extent offset by a lower
rate of investment and greater unemploy*
ment in Belgium than in the other coun-
tries of northern Europe. The lag in
westment left Bel..' • high-cost
producer, more vulnerable to competition
when the era of shortages had passed*35
Had the Belgian government started an ail-out in-
vestment program In 1944-1945, the picture might have
• In 1938, the rate of exchange was 29.68 per U*3.
dollar 5 in 1950, it become 50.12.
34. It id . 5 p. 263$ Diaboldj o£. cit., p. 202.
35. Price, 0£. cit.j p. 262-263.
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bean more encouraging. It must be remembered that
Belgium Is the only country in Europe in which all the
minea are owned by private Individuals* The* govern-*
ment encouraged the closing down of less productive
mines, and amalgamation Vhenever possible; however,
the closing down of mines resulted in unemployment
and discontent* Beyond this, the government was re-
luctant to stick its nose Into what it believed to be
private business*
A little might be said here about the Benelux
union * a precursor of ECSC* Benelux was born with the
signing of a customs union convention In London in 1944
by Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands* It began
to function as a customs union on 1 January 1948*
Customs duties were eliminated and a common tariff was
established without a transitional period. until this
time, in BLEU, Belgium and Luxembourg had a special
arrangement in which Belgium provided Luxembourg with
sufficient coke for steel production, and Luxembourg
36
furnished Belgium with finished steel*
Europe wa3 slowly approaching Its 1958 coal pro-
duction level by 1950* Belgium led the field at this
time, running well ahead of her pre-war prouuctiont
——i n ! lam * i«i «] i + *!*. i> i m iiim i»i> iwiW *!!— —iwMmi n , iiij*wiMMwMiMMiMaMwww»*w>w*iwi i—w*M*M»mmamjm*
36* lleade^ og* cit>, p* 109*
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In 1950, her an. ual coal product! a 27,234,000
(see Table 2) as- against 19,585,000 metric tons in
1930*
As early as 1949 and 1950, OBSC voiced concern
over the excess stocks or coal building up in Belgium*
Due to continued importa of U*S« coal under long-term
contracts, Bel^um was unable to dispose of her cur-
rent output, J« order to continue increased produc-
tion and elinin-te stockpiling, the Ministerial Coal
Production Group of OEEC recommended that "both pro-
ducing and consuming countries should regularly
collect, from their own nationals, and supply to the
appropriate internation body, adequate information
about their stock position*" In this way a it was
hoped that by 1954 large quantities of coal imports
could be dispensed with*
Early in 1950, Belgium began to retrench* As
shown in liable 2, coal production was almost 1*2
million metric tons less in 1950 than in 1949* This
was mainly a result of the steel production cutback*
During 1949 and 1950, some Belgian coal producers even
exported a large bulk of their output at prices below
the domestic prices to rid themselves of it*
i » ' ' " » » «i i i m ii jn in » , ii « i i i i n m ii m i n ima l
37. OSEC, Se c end Report , op » cit*, p. 21*
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In June 1950, the outbreak of the Korean War gave
new life to the coal and steel industry* Coal once
Again was In short supply, with 25 million tons of U'.S*
coal being imported into Europe in 1951 to keep her
38
industries moving*
Belgian coal production in 1951 increased almost
9 percent over the 1950 figure at a time when coal im-
ports were coming into Europe in a great quantity*
I he steel industry was unable to use up this glut of
coal* By 1952, Belgium was still faced with the problem
of disposing of her coal stocks*
Soon Belgium would be in the Common Market for
coal* &ev coal industry was riddled with many problems*
problems that would not be solved quickly, and possibly
not at all#





I# ATTITUDES OH INTEGRATION
On 9 May 1950, the f ranch Foreign Minister M*
Robert Schuman declared that the French government
proposed to negotiate with Germany "to place Franco-
German production of coal and steel under a common
High Authority, within the framework of an organisa-
tion open to the participation of the other countries
1
of Europe » f?
This plan - which became known, as the Schuman
Flan - was enthusiastically endorsed by the Belgian
government*
At the time of the proposal, Belgium's coal
industry was harassed by unemployment, forced cut-
backs in production, and excess coal stocks. Finan-
cial assistance from the government was being extend-
ed to the coal industry in an effort to modernise the
mines, and make Belgian coal more competitive with the
other coal producing countries of Europe*
1» Information Service of the European Com-
munities, +„en Years of the Coal and Steel Common Market
(Ghent: Krasmus, 19657* ?• 13*
28

he jrcvemment, on fiSsy or7 ©fccNl Iti decision to
attend the forth- 5 Paris Conference %i t In
2
• otiattens*
The advai-a^es of Joining s-'.ch a union wer^ both
political and economic* Polit 5.c ally., Belgium had always
been an advocate of Enr Integration* >jc'- such
a eaaauunity would he another t*ung up the ladder tewttfc*6g
a united Slurope* Ec cally, suoh an organisation
night help to solve many of the Belgian coal problems*
Prior to entering such an apg&ftlxfetltt&i however,
special conrjitnents to preteet high-cost Belgian coal
would have to be negotiated*
Coal* as ever, was a very important part of the
Belgian economy* Exposing it to competition with low-
cost coal ?/ithout some sort of protection might prove
disastrous, especially if government subsidies and
other support had to be removed*
Within Belgium's coal industry* feelings on
integration varied* For the most part, labor welcomed
Integration, management did not* The Belgian mine owners,
unaccustomed to government direction since the end of
2* John Goormaghtigh, European Goal and Steel




fchfl war* vl dianta; ' m s c itrola by
3
a 1- Tori!
&6 d, among the most opposed to
the Treaty were the ind : ; b f the
BorizuagG coal ~. ^r?., fearing shut-
downs, organised a c ainst the plan* !$&• cam-
paign met with failure, \?er, because the useya of
realised bfcj.at t i^ing the subsidies to
keep the marginal coal nines in operation* Coal orlces
had placed a "(Jrag or fcfa« and had made
4
export prico j .etc too high.*
Shortly after the negotiations for the drafting
of the coal and steel treaty were underway* in June
30, the Korean War brolce out* The war brought B
a renewed dc I or co?l« This demand postponed
ting down of high-cost marginal mines* As
mentioned earlier, the end result was that Belgium was
stuck with even greater coal surpluses on her hands*
_s critical situation intensified the need for join-
ing the ComLiunity.
3* Diebold, o£. cit , 3 p. 107 «
4* -j L, Mason, jThe European Coal an d Steel Com*
muni ty : ^p-jrl^cr.t in .Tuprara* Lgpn ( The Hague!
luartinus I.ijhoff, 195 5;, pp« 999 7*
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a 20 'June 1950, the del : in Paris
for the :.oal and steel ta , &£
"od th- I©| tea with Pierre
Heet for etecl Pierre Belville as t 1 c Spokefliaail
5
for the coal Industry*
/• the negotiation table, the Belgian delegates
v;orkec te check the ] -f the to
"ensure greater fr« for "business within the Com**
5
munity. n
Belgian businesr \ -.-. toned to having the
last word in pricf |a elf-organization*
orefore, the "an delegates wer: wary of the
supranr- 1 powers o - 1 by a ' ity
over business* Belgium enjoyed a very rapid recovery
after the Second World War, and did not went to jeo-
pardize her economic position.
sec or.;
1 in July 1950, the Belgians
and Dutch joi: ' I' proposed the establishment of an inter**
governmental body to subject the High Authority to
some kind of review* The French fought the arrangement?
however, agreement was arrived at, and the Council of
b* Diebold, en, ci
t





Ministers was authorized* The Belgian negotiators
were app^iensive that controls over business by an
irnational authority might prove to be unconstitu-
tional in Belgium*
The Belgians were nob completely happy with what
they were able to achieve at the negotiation table*
Pierre van der Rest summed up Belgium's disappointment
when he said
J
I persist in believing that it would have
becvu posc^bi& \m es&abl & yagime that
was more supple and entailing less risk
of .Leading oo a ui.x'x^^s.ae the 5 - - EGMft
excessive because of the powers of decision
boat ore entrusted u u feue High Au ^y
and because initiatives that until now -
at least in our QOU - could be
by the heads of business to deal with
cej. situ* terribly restricted
• ••But this is a matte*? of a compromise
solution and for a country oi the relative*
ly small importance of Belgium one cannot
have the illu 1 that v;e couj
hundred percent of all the guarantees and
arrange 9 »/e would desire «B
owed ..stiealiy, 3e and G-srr. :>he
most important partners in who Community, ut
them, there could be no G< .ty for coal ant steel.
fhe Treaty draf fc was completed in December 1950,
and turned over to the goverc .... ~s for review* Certain
sections of the Treaty draft were left blank, and it
was up tc the govc fill in these specifics
3« j. 1








; oimcil of Ministers*
• A mstfber of other orrstrizational matters,
principally those de "to the relatione between the
9
lax small lemtMtiPS* :lux countries and
?ly were Stsustlfiably concerned about the two
major producers, Franc the a Federal ' lie*
«
~ wanted to asr- - -Ives that a coalition of
the French e an Vfc ot make the Community
an Instrument of their control*
Solutions tor t elj coal problem were not
inclu. ed in fcha d &aty« but were left with the
insitional Cc~- ee to be worked out*
The European C a"' Steel Community Treaty was
signed by the Foreign Ministers - Paul van Zealand for
10
Belgium - on 18 April 1951* The Treaty was then
turned over to the Parliaments for ratification*
During debate over ratification* many reserva-
tions and outright fears were voiced in the Belgian
Parliament 9 as in most of the other Parliaments of the
Treaty iignators* In general, the discussion followed
, ; , 105*
1C* -on "xo^.r^ g£ t.Ut> Y uaX*^t.eel Comaon iuarket* op *





J; f fllrigi sms; ;





concern ovor absence of Britain and other
dislocating impact of removing trade barriers
:s of '..rig rid of them J
political control versus tf technocracy," the
Ge]
pool j and so on* 2-3.
The voting methods drawn up and the establ'm
ment of the Council of ^ lax stars wore devised to lay
to rest fears th»vfc the large nations would ride roughs-
shod over the opinions and needs of their smaller
brothers.
-owever, predictab? ..eft. of the ho t of the
controversy erupted over the plight of the high-cost
coal nines* There was much apprehension that a Common
Market for coal would mean cutbacks in Belgian produe*
tion and result In more unemployment* The coal Indus*
try waged war against ratification of the Treaty! bv.t
it was generally realized that whether the Treaty v/aa
ratified or mjc, so: be done to
solve the problems of th© coal industry.
ere was much debate in the Belgian Parliament
on the constitutionality of suob a Treaty* Si
senators felt that -ranting such control to the High
11, .old, ©g« vtt- .i , 05»

Authority would prevent the Belgian courts from "check-
ing abuses". his group believed that such authority
should be given to a court, and not to an executive
body, ^hey also feared loss of sovereignty and loss
of "personality" if Belgium should join such an organ!-
sa ion*
Foreign Minister van ieoland pointed out that
as long es the Treaty was in Belgium 1 s interest n :i
could not ••• limit ... ian sovereignty." - ad 11*
tion, he not-. s com not specif
~
12
ically fcrbid Belgian participation in the Community.
:.rc was some talk about amending the constitu-
tion in oruer to pcve the way for entry into the Common
r-ket for coal and steel, but, in the final analysis,
such a move was considered unnecessary. As one senator
remarkeo:
hare violated the constitution before
.3 war, curing . % .id after
war. *e violated her in such a way
the poor girl does net even complain
any more, she ( ot cry any longer. Such
cons loaal considerations do not
even Interest me any more.
The tocialists had long seen nationalisation as
the panacea for oh. .ry f s problems. Fhej v.'sre
therefore In favor of sor.e reorganization lav/j at least
•IS. Ibid.* p. IS.
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. . -.ary 1952, The vote sag 102
50 a) j , _b 1 or wa. . Iso split in its
-port of „ the urging of Paul-lleiiri
patlf ed








t. ^et, at the same could not help Ir
•k favorably this Treaty, because of their tra~
16
Lonal intere;:
. tenia tionalisnu m final vote
gave a dec 3 ; for ra v'.f :'.co\jioru Q&¥$
however| v7a.p gain« "' stron bitter
opposition. i 56 liate present in the Chamber
six voted against the treaty i 13 abs > 'he
14* |&M*i - : » 2UU
15. Diebold, op, ci . • 33, 106-1C ,
16* Hans A, Se&tltfc. The Path to European Union*











seven Communists in the Chamber voted against the treaty*
In general, in the Chamber, the Socialists, the
-iberaJ.H, and the SoO'ta
of utie
- ./« e Ccobs Inst
18
it,
3SC Tre: -_to force on £55 July 19
with a flf life*
.030 as uod V cor Robert
Schuman:
siona? of joint pro:" • m
io» of coal and steel in a market of 170
Lillian people, with no tr.r5.ff valid and







...ercised by Id ensure
th ner coal nor steel could be us< 19
in 3 ;;ion £©* j a I d&*
f >3* tutho^ity and
the Court of Justice to he in Luxembourg, with
* Council of r.i: - argi to
final it seat for the
i soowe ef negotiations
on the 3aar»
Sehuman h. - u?tei*s ^nr
, but
17. Spnst * ".;.; "- -rope; Political s






i > 1'958), p« 18©«
18« ...son, o£. cit ., p. 11 #
*
___;: £gLI J2a 3 '. '.
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.' """"isn Mayket* o£«
clot , p» 4»
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Konrad Adenauer, then Chancellor of West Germany, was
against such a plan. He felt that this "implied
aai .Ion c. aer" would hi; my ! s
:\e Sa?-r, B< Igium an^' I ted upon
this cc &* felt ; such a cecizloi:. ${3





later on other rranco*GerLian a 33 •"
III. CD
It v*ras clear that the treaty provisions could
not come insc effect overnight. It was left to the
Iransitional Committee to draft the terms of the Cond-
ition, which were to be the rule 3 during the five-
year ...anal period. As might be expected, the
ileat problems . cent, mainly on coal.
For the Committee had to hammer out temporary measure*
to e. 1 9 — -islooation, whioh would cer-
tainly result from dL~ abrupt removal of protective
mea supe s on coal pr o«uc t i on
.
Belgians were particularly concerned about
their high-cost production mines, an; -ce salty of
20. Diebold, op* £it#, p. 110.
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closing down many marginal minoiu Subsidies seemed
to be the answer, but I. I wont to bear






co to s ' m* ':e*j felt that the
problem wafi " • for the - iron
out by itself* . - that
22
Be" • itslc*e t'?o Cofflauntty for the p:- t.
'Ter, ! In vis 1?? of
their lower cos- produetloii| l
coal producers would have bo pay o< iation<
the Iglan eoal m3 I ' ha
iation»
?.? a
percentage of receipt?. It Was to atari " '-
mum levy cf I #3 ' I to r
of here was
as - vy
collects •- to V ' " '" t'rr -©
Jtal Ian
21 . T pp# eltu . p» 66«




countries contributing an equ&l amount.
Belgium also reoe x, in enber»»
ing the Community :^.r a op d
by more than 3 percent a year during bhe period of
transit!. „ 9 ,o prevail unless the
production 0? the other members reduced proportion-
afceXyf
.0 pro ns abi w*re as, ior-on in Section
26 ^ Convention x A)« Certain broad
purpoc - ,v by uhis compensation
scheme i'or Belgium^
1« "•••to enable the prices paid by users of
.ian coal to k ...ore near those
or- coal in
2» "••tc insure t eel industry
'.
._ I rel< :ious
a of hi ; costs, and
3* "••• ;o p< ian coal to be sold else-
oi-e in b) a .... . in such amounts as
24
aoritj .eeui -iocessay .
..:..; 1 ., vn-
me - • e -'uuce




trade barriers with other eoal producing countries*
One of th© first measures in the establishment
of the Common Market was the reduction or abolition
of previously existing trade barriers, -his was ac-
tually of little consequence for coal as it entered
virtually duty-free in all member countries except
Italy which had a duty of 15 percent on all coke lm°»
26
ports*
As there was no guarantee that the transitional
period measures would be sufficient to accomplish its
purpose* a special clause was adcied to the Convention
permitting the Belgian market to separate from the
Community after the transitional period for a maximum
of four years if necessary to complete the trans!**
tional process* The Belgian government* with the approv-
al of the High Authority* would be authorized to grant
subsidies to coal producers to achieve the required
27
adjustments.
The Common Market for coal was established on
10 February 1955 when the High Authority took office*
25* Ibid *, p* 292*
26* ibid * a p* 200*





I* ORGANIZATION OF THE COAL INDUSTRY
Ownership o£ collieries * The coal mines in
Belgium are privately owned* The southern Belgium
firms operate one or more small mines each* In th©
Campine, the seven pits are operated by seven inde-
pendent firms*
.Many of the pits in the south are owned by four
financial groups in Belgium. Three of these financial
groups and French steel interests control 100 percent
of the firms in the Campin©* In 1955 8 58 percent of
the coal production in southern Belgium was owned by
these groups* The remaining 42 percent was owned by
independents* Table 3 shows the concentration of ow«*
nership of Belgian coal production as of 1955*
*n addition to the holdings shown in Table 5.
the Societe General© also has interests in the Maat-
schappij tot Exploitatie van Steekolenmijnen Laura
1
ooal mines in Ltmburg* Holland*




CONCENTRATION OF C';KTRGL CF BELGIAN 3QAL PRODUCTION, 1955











































About 1/3 used i*or coking, «
Sometimes called Confinindus-Brufina.
100 30,023 iW>
In addition to these groups indicated in Table 5 f
a Luxembourg firm ARBED » Acieries Reunies de Burbach*»
3ictr»Dudelange » has some coal subsidiaries in Belgium*
When the Campine coal basin was discovered j the
Belgian government considered complete state owner«
ship of this b sin following the Butch example » But
in the end the government only took over three reserves*
These are strategically located in the western, center $
and eastern parts of the .field and occupy about one-
6
sixth of the total basin*





4* Dieboid, og* eit «» p. 129,
5# ilonkhouse, op, cit , a p. 122 a
« 44 *»

The question of nationalization of the pits came
up in the Belgian Parliament as early as 1920, but
the proposal was not approved. In 1955* a bill for
opening new mines in the Carapine went down to defeat
because of the concentrated efforts of the Socialists
who hoped to later push through a bill on nationalization.
In June 1957, the Belgian government submitted a bill
to the Parliament for the granting of additional pit
concessions in the Campins on a nationalized basis*
6
A coalition of Socialists and Liberals passed the bill.
However, no new pits have been opened to this date,
because the demand for coal has not been great enough
to warrant I Sional pit openings
.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Treaty,
nationalization of mines Is not an Illegal act as long
as It does not interfere with the provisions of the
7
Treaty.
Reorganization* The efficiency of coal mining
is dependent on the mine's size and Its preparation
plant. The High Authority felt that concentration
of pits would improve the efficiency of the Belgian
coal indsutryi however, nothing had come of their pro-
6* Lister, on. civ,,, p. 117.
7. ECSC. Treaty Eptabl.iahing the European Goal and
Steel Connunity . (London: Fanfare Press Ltd.) p. 55.
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posal until 1957 and 1958* when a number of marginal
pi^o were closed and their coal brought to the sur*»
face by neighboring mines whose improved surface equip-
ment rendered them more productive*
During the transitional period, the Belgian gov-
ernment favored amalgamations, and the closing down
of loss efficient and high-cost production pits. Mo*
dernizauion also was encouraged to increase production
and reduce costs. Closing of pits, however, was a
very touchy business because of the unemployment and
-oeial problems that it would leave in its wake.
The Campine and the anthracite-producing Liege
mines presented no problem. The problem centered
around those mines in the Southern Belgium Basin which
were small and lacked capital for full-scale moderni-
zation. Therefore, this section will concentrate on
the reorganization of the collieries in southern Bel*
gium.
Table 4 shows the Belgian mines in operation
throughout the first ten years or membership in the
Community. From 1951 to the end of 1962, 95 pits
have been closec. .hirteen pits were closed before
entry into the Common Market for coal on 10 February




PITS IN OPERATION BY COAL FIELD
3
Date Centre Charier©! Liege Borinage Caiapine Total
1 Jan. 1951 18 62 41 28 7 156
10 Feb. 1953 17 3D 35 25 1 143
10 Feb. 1958 15 52 26 20 7 120
1 Jan. 1959 12 47 23 18 f 107
1 Jan. 1960 • . • • .•>•»•.« a total of Ou *«*....<, 7 JO
1 Jan. 1961 • » • • ••••.... a total of 66 ........ 73
1 Jan. 1962 3 29 19 5 7 63
1 Jan. 1963 3 29 17 5 7 61
Duping the transitional period, very littia was
accomplished towards integration by the coal industry
although 23 pits were closed, and subsidies were paid
to various nines for improvements and to cover losses*
The main problem seemed to stem from the unwilling*
ness of the Belgian s;ovemraent to take drastic measures
to insure that reorganization in the coal mining indu*»
9
try was taking place* Too much reliance had been
placed on the coal producers to set up a program of
reorganization under their own initiative* In terms
of planning f the government left a vacuum which it
hoped the coal producers would fill* but in fact*, the
producers did not*
Some mine owners* in lieu of modernizing their
mine s., used the subsidies paid to them mainly for pay*
8 * Seventh General Report * o£* cit * * p* 77$ Eleventh
General Report. jd£« o 1
1
« * p* 241.
9» Diebold* ojd* cit » » p* 598*
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ing off their debts* The High Authority felt compelled
to insist that the subsidy payments be used chiefly for
capital investments* The High Authority's urgings,
10
however, were for tht | part ignored*
The transitional period was a booming period*
»re was a need to keep low-output, high-cost nines
operating, and ;o Import coal as well. Rot until the
coal crisis hit in 1958 did a reorganization program •
which meant the cits" rm ef marginal mines - ir.ove
for-, arc with vigor*
Until 1957, big] -cost mines, which were still in*
11
dependent , "discourage':." ties of a proprietary nature.. 11
At the end of the transitional period in 1958, 48 firms
\/er-« operating 113 mines in southern Belgium with an
avera- e annual output of about 400,000 metric tons
12
per firm and 170,000 tons per mine* Subsidies were
.11 required in ore . o aceonplish full-scale
reorganisation*
The Belgian government submitted proposals to the
High Authority for further subsidization of the coal
industry* Ifea High Authority would not accept these
proposals unless thmf were accompanied by a definite
10. - . Henderson, The Genesis
,
of the Common
Market [ om onJ Frank C&aa and Co., Ltd.,""l962), pT"T52«





ie Belgian government assigned the task of work-
out a reorganization plan to a group of experts
within the Conseil National dos Charfeonnages, A law
was passed on 24 January 1958 remooelinr the Conseil
clonal "in order to faeil* the operations for
the structural
. Ir.ation of the coal mining in*
fcryj such as shutdowns, regroupings and mergers."
Powers of dec i In these mattery were ^Iven to
the Consets Loua! under Article 7 of the law.
The group was estal on 24 Jv". 938 and
mev / august* Three *t%y representatives
sat in* itteos were set u] . One I
Sooncanle Sub-Co gh was to study the possible
se~ pric-: I " ; tt "or Eel-
in coal to make it c the ( unity« The
other was the Techno ub-Cc. ' tee which was to study
the possibilities for adjusting the costs of the Belgian
collieries to the b ret ents* e Sub-Come: ittoe
15
was also to study plans for regional converso -
Reports on their findings were to be made to the Conseil
ttioneJU
13 « BCSC* Ninth General Report on the Activities.
of the C oirnur.lt
^








The Economic Sub-Committee's report was submit-
ted 30 October 1958 and was adopted unanimously. -*-he
report divided coal into three markets; coking coal,
steam-raising coal, and household coal. The follow-
ing recommendations were made J
1. If coke is to sell* it must be competitive
with the Ruhr, and therefore a price reduction of 10-15
percent is necessary.
2# As s team-raising coal is in great competi-
tion from other energy sources and consequently ex-
periencing a steadily decreasing market, prices should
again be level with pithoad prices. A reduction of
15-20 percent was callec for*
3* X'he price of anthracite would be unchanged,
or reduced 5 percent, depending on further cuts required
by oil competition.
Using this report, the group worked out the pro-
duction volume to be maintained for each type of coal
within the existing industrial structure, ihe report
made by the group was entitled, Consequences dea
reductions ce prix sur le volume ce la production* and
constitutes the framework of the reorganization
urogram. It was a"0^r-o*/ci' by the Consoil National on
16
8 December- 3 ?58«
16. Ibid.,, pp. 78-79.
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The study by the Technical Sub-Committee was to
be a more lengthy undertaking, as it had to examine
each coal field to find out just what action was need-
ed to trim production costs*
The Sub-Committee began with the Borinage and
submitted its report to the Gonseil National on 19
January 1959. Their findings Indicated that five mar-
ginal collieries should raer^e in the Borinage to form
one company operating five pits ( at the moment, they
were operating 14)
•
The report was not accepted* The main objection
to the proposal was that the Borinage area was primarily
a one-Industry economy dependent on coal mining^ and
that "a cushion for the social impact" of unemploy-
ment had to take place before reorganization could >^e
17
effected*
A plan for the Borinage was finally accepted in
February 1969« The acceptance led to a number of severe
strikes and disturbances in the area* The plan called
for the regrouping of five companies into one. Two
other companies would remain independent* Certain
production capacities were to be eliminated, and seven









The program for the Centre district was consider*
ed in June I35S, and approve a ' t ,;ell on 26
Ocuooer* Ehree 90 ore u o bo regrouped into
uany, anc mXm osher pits were to be closed
ius reducing production from 1,2 to 0,9 million
19
trio tons)*
July 1959| t! Charlearoi | « calling for
closures only - was reviewed, !Tc plan had been drawn
up for ohe Liege district, although some pits were
closed under their own initiative.
But it was not all closures. In the Campine,
the cou/ittee plan roc $ &xpan*!en of production
for that coal -rich area* Ca^pine reeorves through
legislation belong to t' S atoj ' sr, as *8J
cloned earlier, because of the coal crisis and re-
.id, new nits i not opened arc"!
20
fact have not heen opened to this dr.te,
ithordtty m remind
the Belgian government that under Section 26 of the
Cc ".on subsidies and tonnages subsidized had tr
be api " ". „ the £ .uthority* The High Authority
18, EC SO, '"•:;/.
'' General Resort on the Activi-
ties of the C oirr.un.Tty (Luxemb our
g
t 1 £6fl ) 9 p, 14$.
T5,
20, Ibid,, p, 144,
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was itself required to submit the figure on the ton-
nages tc be subsidized to the Council of Ministers
every two years for approval* Subsidies paid by the
Belgian government were also to be sealed down. On
15 January 1959, the Belgian government mad© a deci*
sion to establish a program of regularly decreasing
subsidies for the next few years* This new plan for
economic assistance called for payments as follows?
1. In 1958, Bfr 900 million,
2 • In 1959, Bfr 800 million.
3, In I960, Bfr 600 million,
4* Nothing was to be paid from 1965 onward.
The subsidies would be paid through the Conseil
National which would supervise the utilisation ©f the
money granted.
The progress of the reorganization program went
well during the period 1958 to 1961, Forty~aix pits
were closed. Based on 1957 production figures* this
was a cut of some 6,300,000 metric tons. Closures
effected and planned were highest in the Borinage and
Centre areas with 58 percent in the Centre, 59 percent
in the Borinage, and 32 percent of both the Liege and
22
Charleroi areas.
2 ^* Seventh General Report s op « pit,^ pp* 77, 80,
22, ECSCj HintF^^ier^llfeport on the Activities




On Si July 1959;, the High Authority submitted
to the Council of Ministers the pit closure report
supplied by the Belgian government, which provided
for closing 15 pits in 1959^ 10 in 1960, 5 in 1961*
and 4 thereafter, with a total loss of production eapa~
city of 5.5 million tons. These closures were to be
completed by 30 June 1961 (High Authority Decision
23
No. 40/59),
On 21 November 1959, the Belgian government suh~
mitted a memorandum to the High Authority describing
the sever8 conditions in the coal industry, and re»
questing implementation of Article 37 (See Appendix
B) of the Treaty. On 23 December 1959, after receiv~
ing the approval of the Council of Ministers, Article
37 of the Treaty was implemented (High Authority
Decision No. 46/59} • In taking this action, the High
Authority immersed itself deeply into the Belgian coal
problem and its reorganisation*
It was also decided at this time, after reviewing
present costs, that shutting down 5.5 million metric
tons of capacity would not be sufficient to stabilize
prices. The High Authority and the Belgian government




agreed that a shutting down of 9.5 million metric tons
of capacity was far more realistic, i'hls new figure
of capacity was uheref ore accepted as "non-inte^-able
in the light of the current selling prices." The Bel-
gian government began revising its closure timetable
to provide for the new reauced capaci y requirements*
In general ^ it was to follow a reduction plan of 2.3
million tons in 1959, 2.5 million tons in I960* 2
million tons in 1961, and 2*7 million tons in 1962
24
and 1963.
Although closures were carried out on schedule*
the Belgian coal market still showed an Imbalance
between production and sales; the picture did not im-
prove until the end of 1960. In laying out Its closure
plan, the Belgian government, because of economic
and social pressures did not see fit to designate by
name the pits which would be elosea over the period
of the next four years. By the end of 1S80, however,
closures effected amounted to 5.0 million tons of
25
capacity, 0.2 million tons over the planned figure.
On 26 September 1960, the Belgian government
submitted enotbe* memorandum to the High Authority
24. Ibid., pp. 155-154.
25. Ninth G-eneral Report , op . cit., p. 110.
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concerning the implementation of Decision Ko. 46/59.
The memorandum brought then up to date on the state
of the coal Industry. Continuation of Article 37 was
requested. The High Authority concurred and passed
the extension petition on to the Council of Ministers
on 29 November 1S60. On 20 December 1960, Decision
No. 25/50 was taken by tgfe Authority which extend-
26
ed the application of Article 37.
The Conseil Natjlanalj on 19 October I960* approved
the following closures for 1961: two each in the Bor-
inage and Gen ere districts, three in the Charleroi,
and one in the Liege districts* da capacity to be
closed down totaled 1.7 million tons, and was to be
completed by i,he and of June 1961* e Belgian gov-
ernment assurer i;he High Authority that it would
specify by 1 June the remaining closures for 1961 to
27
bring the total up to the required 2.0 million tons.
On 10 November 1961, the Belgian government sub-
mitted another memorandum to the High Authority des-
cribing the condition of the coal industry and its
eiDec"Js on the Deigian economy. It once again request-
ed axtonalon of Article 37 of the Treaty. In order
26. ibid
. j pp. 111-112, 114.
27. 'ibid. a p. 113»

for the High Authority to further implement Article
57, the Belgian government was required to submit a
sche ule of pit closures for 1062, which it. had not
done as yet.
An act of the Belgian Parliament, on 16 November
1961 established a new board known as oho Directoire
de 1* Industrie Cnarbonniere, whose duties in the re-
organization program are as f allows
s
1. "Ordering any leasing, assignment, or
amalgamation of concessions which may be deemed neces*
sary to improve output and costs.
2. "Ordering of closure of pits whose poor
production is an obstacle to balanced market, or whose
28
prices are higher. than the satisfactory price level."
A time schedule was made up by ch® new Directoire
and presented to the High Authority. Sith the Council s s
approval, -high Authority Decision 13/61 of 13 December
1961 extended application of article 37 in Belgium's
29
favor for 1962. Another itemized list of closures
amounting to 2.5 million tons of capacity was due by
31 -lay 1362. A new list was submitted, but by the end
of 1962 only 0.503 million tons capacj-ay was closed
28. ECSC. xenth General Report on the Activities of
the C ommuni zj (Luj&erubourk': 1962}, p. 150.
29. Ibid ., p. 157.
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mdown, leaving £.0 million tons to be closed down in
50
1963.
Although productivity was up and the application
01" Arr. : ele 37 was withdrawn in 1963 - oocause of the
over-all Improvement in the a c oal industry -
there are sti" ay problems reft $«
II, PRODUCTION
Consumption * The transitional period began in a
spirit of boom anc optimism* Consequently low-output
ines, which should have been laid to rest, kept
operating. unl.Il 1957, production fell short of demand f
however, the gap was always filled by imports* In
1958, the situation did an about-face, and the Ceamiun*
| found Itself ixcess stocks and a need o
eat down on production. s coal crisis which fol-
lowed will be discussed lz WX% section*
;ere ar-j numerous reasons why coal is losing its
hold on the energy market in the So '.nee 1958*
The "iOst important ones are a 3 follows:
!• Energy go Ion * particularly coal - is
exp . " r rate tfe*n Industrie! production*
2 # Wa'^er power li replacing coal more and more





5* Mild winters have reduced h< --equireEients*
4» tm&a coal is required to produce larger srsounfcs
*a»?gy .o more 1 tut coal utilization natfeftCft*
5« Othor fuels » especially oil * have been
replacing coal in existing plants* and getting a
OX
big er csarke t fron new expansion*
6« Rising coal prices* primarily due to rising
wa:-es* have given other energy sources a competitive
advantage*
In Belgium* hit hare.eat by the eo&l recession*
the share or coal Tor energy production dropped from
8'9.5 percent in 1950 to 72*5 percent in 1958* ?abl«
5 shows the trends in energy consumption currently
as comparec to 1953*
A hard winter in 1962 was principally responsible
for a slightly brighter picture in the Belgian coal
position* As temperatures dropped* demands for coc^l
and other energy sources increased* A small increase
in coal consumption is also forecast tor 1965* it is
expected as well that coke stocks will decrease in
Belgium in 1963»
3X» ISEGj l&'g, :.sod edition t 1968)* p,3l»
8$, Bt*i ta$ Coal HU* Up", ^u,s£ue^:, j^jjs





TRENDS IN ENCRfflr CONSUMPTION IN BT3LGIUU G4
(•000, 000 metric tons H.C.E.)
f«nr Hard Broim Petroleum Prisi&E'y Water Total
Coal Coal Products Gas INhwi
1958 22.925 0.068 8.410 0.126 0.104 31.63
1961 23.56 0.06 10.35 0.07 m 34.02
1962**' 24.10 0.07 12.01 0.07 - 36.24
1963
(b) 22.97 0.07 13.34 0.07 - 36.45
(a) Estiuatod.
(b) Forecast.
Restricts inr, 0:r^ Bj m&mt Article 37 of the Ireaty,
al
" cr rating a greater demand for coal
Ir. iura, vhs competitive position of Belgit | il
price*vise iappeved i*
,
with ?rc0 " m remain-
35
lng close to the 1961 level*
During 1963 MM ~!y 1964, the 6m*a& for coal
In the Community was feirly strcr fe$ tie con-
sistent expansion of Industry at an annual rate of
5 percent. This hae he on couple (3 with a recovery in
the iron and steel industry. Laprovaatnti in the
iron and steel industry has increase-.;' fctw de.nand for
36
colre ae reIT,
Within the Cfi Lty by 1970, It is anticipated
that tonnmgea of coal, «rl ' b will be c ; th
•
Eleven tfa General jtefcort, oo. oi t.t p. loij
Eighth General Keoort^ joo. ci t .
,, p. 77*
or, 1Q4 *5»JB^fv<iftffi Sgag>fil Report . o£, .git., pP . 96-97, 123, 213. ^^
35. "ECSC forecasts Return to Steele Coal Out-
Put * European Community . No. 70 (April 1964), p. 6.
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other fuels, w:V "!.! off considerably frc aunt
w produced* A steep rise in productivity is
expected* co In production* Im-
ports of oil will probably rise sharply* By 1970,
barely one '1 of the e; -lents in the
;y vili be met by coal, ar " fej 1975 that figure
will read 25 percent. By 1970, o'.l move Into
a position of leadership with 50 percent of the energy
37
market*
It " " . - rt
of the G ark fe C " -ion ( *Investments in
the Oil lac ' /* ) thai Com-
munity's oil consumption is expected to rise almost
48 percent between 1952 and 19' 6. ;:a-
Luxembourg oil o - - as 10 million metric
tons In 1962. '..'lis figure la expected to IS to
38
13 million b-j 19.9%
Coal Recession^ Long before the coal surplus
reached its peak level in 1958, coal producers in
Belgium could see the handwriting on the wall, and
called for governmental protection* rhe Belgian
37* Eleventh ueneral Report. ., op » cit «, pp* 169-
I78j par j>r,r~:-. SS l£ >' (ToT"62 IAprIlSaayrt 1993), p. 13.
33, '*C n Predicts Doubling of Oil
Consume in Five ears*" European C^p^/ait;: , No. 67
(November - December, 1963), p* 7*
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government was at first riot too disturbed* The
government took a wait-and-see attitude as any change
in the coal situation would stir up n hornet 1 * nest
invcl* readjustmenta of coal prices and subsidies,
and further inquiry by the Sigb Authority in the high*
^.es in the south*
uy of the problem! that developed in the Bel*
glan coal industry during this period were character-
istic of the Community coal Industry as a whole*
Tfee end of 195? marked a turning point in the
Common Mark t for coal* Shortages gave tray to sur-
plus, and a real and urgent is - of large-seale un-
>loyment arose « Coal producers found it extremely
'fleult to sell all of their current outputs, because
of Isj? :.r* porta fr^ third countries (especially
Unit- atea), the mild winter, end the replace-
ment of coal b- ther ^n^v^v sources* From 1 January
1958 to the end ef April 1959, Belgian coal stocks
rose frets 1»7 to ?,9 million tons, abent 29 percent
of the 195R output. These stocks were valued at Bfr
4,500 million, and oaus« muefa financial distress to
collierlas | wa hindered modernisation*
A large percentage of the surplus was low-p-rade
2»i
cool.
S9. ?'• -., u* cit. , ??* 248-249: ^i.rhth General
Report , op . ciu » p. 153.
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Between 1957-1059, r,he contraction of demand for coal
by Belgian consumers atad to 12*7 percent. In
1957, exports were almost as large as Imports. In
1958, exports fell rapidly and imports only moderate-
ly. Tim decline in exports was attributable mainly
to inter-Community trace. The trade deterioration
amounted to 2.4 million tons, about 8.3 percent of
40
the 1957 output*
The initial response was to cut back production
and hope that stocks would decrease. From 1957 to
195S, production in Belgium was reduced 7 percent,
and In 1958-1959, with no si^ns of sales reviving,
16 percent.
By 1959 stocks were only slightly higher than
in 1958. The reduction in production was accomplished
by short-time working and complete closure of some
41
pits.
In an attempt to stem the tide of recession, the
Belgian governments
1. Imposed res trie tions on imports from third
countries.
2. Imposed additional taxes on fuel oil Imports (
3. Slowed down change In consumption to oil
products bJF e lentfi between coal pro-
40. Keadftj op. olt . » p. 305.
41. Ibid., pp. 305-306.
/2 T

ducers and oil importers.
4. Continued paying subsidies to the weakest
collieries at the rate of Bfr 116 per ton, 10 percent
42
or more of -che selling price.
Given the choice of two evils, the High Authority
preferred stockpiling tc unemployment. It proposed
setting up a "stockpiling fund" mad© up of a produc-
ers levy of five cents per ton of coal produced. :ie
£12 million, thus collected, would be returned to the
producers to help ease the burden of stockpiling.
Germany and Luxembourg vetoed the idea. o Council,
however, authorized the ; ;fc Authority to help finance
stockpiling out of its normal levy# The High Authority
put up $7 million for the program. Governments re-
questing aid had uo match the aid given by the High
Authority. Aid was extended to mining firms under
two systems*
1* I"hose receiving a guarantee from the govern-
ment, for the 12 month period beginning on SI October
1958, received a loan of $2 for every ton of coal
put into stock in excess of 55 days production, -the
loan was repayable in five years with no interest.
2. ^ucse re .ng no guarantee from the '-.<v-
42. bid., p. 506.
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jr~>
eiraznent received non-repayable aid from the High
Authority of $1 par ton put into stock*
All the applications had to be submitted by the
firms through their respective governments in either
45
case*
.e liigh Authority later proposed to raise the
funct to ^10 million, and to broaden the eligibility
- to 41 uays for Belgium - but che French government
turned thumbs aown on this, because it wan.ted to
broaden eligibility for its own mines.
During 1959, the crisis in the Belgian coal fields
became worse, in February 1959 the Belgian government
proposed closing some pits in the bleak Borinage
district, ibis touched off strikes and disorders*
The High Authority in concert with the Belgian
government took further action to prevent additional
decreases in production and increases in unemployment*
ihsy sought also to bring about an orderly long-term
contraction through the closure of the least economi-
cal pits without causing further economic and social
problems* in the summer of 1959, a subsidy similar
to that paid in cue last year of the transitional
43. r, og* ci-., ?p* 353-334*
44* ., p* 334*
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period was In * . purpose pa I e firms
cove:. -.\m
-gian coal competitive with Ruhr eoal« .ea
qualii Tor support were Ximii. . liW- . | «•
about 57 p .3 level of outpui in t*
itl:« BLjf
. 26 Billion i: - Although - ftl
amount palC out was *$$&! la the amount [« it
wa& er-ly ,-aic on 5*5 ft I ^oiia*
^ A "manifeat crisis" in the uoal t&ar&et was declare
ed by ti-, ffllqr r«h 1&09* | the
£Len$*j it pr&p$£4
and 74 or the treat- follow." i -feus action*
it $$ iutrouuce . , &et*a fee li*alt the
1959 output to eatiiaated levels*
2* To prevent the sale of existing stocks*
3* 'Jo reduce Cccsaunlty Imports frou thisfi coim>»
triee fey one-naif
i ale© propose .- Article 08 to assist in
atabllla iuccsso . • On 14 £ay» fch*
,mcll sals* Benelux Yiur<t on
re core1 for thcr, the rest a t«




After the Council's disapproval, the itfe*
oritJ" tool: action ^o co. jx>s for ;h#ij los»
of earnin^..,, g
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1» Keeping imports from third countries below
600,000 metric nons in 1960 (this tonnage does hot
include tonaages used in processing). This constitu-
ted a reduction of approximately 400,000 metric tons
(42 percent of the 1959 purchase.)
2. In 1960, imports from Community countries
to Belgium were not to exceed 2*95 million metric tons
(86 percent of 1959 imports.)
3. Belgian exports to the Community were limited
to 1.945 million tons ( 98 percent of 1959 exports.
5
During these negotiations, the High Authority
and Belgian government kept in close contact with
American and British authorities to explain the necess-
ity of these measures, in 1960, the Belgian market
was finally isolated from the Common Market for coal.
This served to limit competition from the Cora-
49
munity and third countries.
During 1959, the internal demand for coal in
Belgium continued falling. It finally leveled off
in the last quarter. Hard coal production in the
Community also fell ofi in 1959 due to the closing of




pits, short-time working, and the exodus of mine
workers from the pits* Ihe year 1959 also saw the
beginning of a reduction in the existing imbalance.
From 10 February to 50 June 1959, 17 pits were
closed in the south, as compared with 23 closed during
the entire transitional period. Stteaa pits produced
1.8 million tons in 1957,
With the invoking of Article 37 of the Treaty,
the Belgian coal industry entered a new phase. New
subsidies and rehabilitation program drawn up by the
Belgian authorities were introduced. x t provided, for
the closing down of 34 southern pits ( capacity 5*5
million tons) by the end of 1961* Readaption for
workers and price policies were also introduced.
After subsidies brought Belgian coal prices in
line with Ruhr prices, on 15 June 1959 a new price
schedule with lower prices was issued. The subsidies
were to be eliminated by 1964.
Even though closures took place, the Belgian coal
market continued to show an imbalance until the end
of 1960. On 26 September 1960, the Belgian government
requested that the High Authority's Decision No. 46/59
be continued during 1961. The High Authority agreed
(Decision No. 25/60). In this new decision, the High
- 69 -

Authority did not set production quotas as it did
previously, but re served the ri^ht to do so for sub-
sidised collieries*
fbi new decision increased trade within the Com~
munity 5.5 percent over the tonnage set in Decision
Ivo. 46/59 for deliveries in Belgium, -hese quotas
could be changed on a ton-f or-ton basis after consul*
tation. Import quotas were also increased to 620,000
50
metric tons in 1961»
During the period 1961 to 1963, stocks decrees/ ij
and the coal situation in Belgium normalised some-
what, but on a very fine balance. By October 1968,
the High Authority decided that Article 37 had
served its purpose and that it was time for Belgium
51
to be re-integrated into the Common Market*
Productivity . When the Common Market for coal
began, pessimists believed that it would bring the
Belgian coal mining industry to its knees. AJt hough,
the industry has had a rough go of it, production has
remained above pre-war levels. During the transition-
al period until 1957, coal production decreased more
50. Ninth General Report s op . jcit., pp. 111-112,
114.
51. I3SC, Community Copies No . 8s 1952-1962 Ten
Years of SCSC {Yeovil, England s Edwin Snell and Sons,
Ltd, 1963), p. 6»
- 70 •

than 4 Percent* During the reorganisation program
that followed until bhfi end of 1952, production de-
creased 27 percent.
Table 6 compares Belgian hard coal production
since the Second World War against 1958 levels.
Table 7 illustrates the trend in output per man-
shift (0,::.s.) Itx 1952, the output per man-shift in
the south was 74 percent of that in the C ampins.
The 0»H.S« in the Campine did not meet the Community
average, although it was f orable with some of th®
larger basins in the Community.
_e Liege had the worst record; however, it
produced a relatively 1 amount of quality
coal.
In Belgium, shifts last eight hours including
winding t5jne. Double shifts are sometimes used when
52
^ood results can be achieved*
It was possible to increase the productivity
of many pits by modernization* ^any of these changes
were made such as : enlarging shafts, installing new
pithead gear, electrification of winches, and other
53
mechanization accelerating underground haulage.
In 1938, the output per man shift was 1.09 tons. By
52. QEEG| Second Report * QP » cit .a pp. 38-68.
























































1962, Q*M«*i had risen to 1 # 97 tons*
During the transitional period up until 1957,
there was a large demand for coal« Consequently* pro~
ouction «• with increased C.M*S. - stayed at a fairly
54 • ^enth General Report » op » cit # a p# 519$
Eleventh General Ho port
* ,££* ciu . « p. 584*
55 • J« Frederic Dewhurst and others, JIurope *
s


































































even level even though 23 pits were closed. After
1957, total production decreased, because of addition-
al mine closures.
Reduced production was accomplished during the
recession period by short-time working and mine closures*
Table 8 illustrates the effects of short- time working
. 221$86. Seventh General Reportg op » cit.,
fiighth General ttft
i
port ."~bp. pit .. p« 280g"" ^inth General
.Report , op . ciu .a o. 365; j.enth General Report s oo.
ci£.» pp. 521, 581f eleventh General, Heport a QP»
cio
.i pp. 585, 656.
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in Belgium • This reduction was necessary because of
large quantities of stocks that were building up at
the Belgian pitheads*
TABLE 8.
SHORT-TIME WORKING IN BELGIAN COAL FIELDS OWING TO LACK OF SALES
1958 1939 1960 1961
Carapine South Carapine South Capipine. South CacipinQ South
Average num~
ber of days not
worked at pits. 14.58 22.46 59.26 50.04 35.78 27.97 17.69 1.99
20.18 52.88 30.84 7.84
Production
forfeited
( «000 m.t.) 556 1577 2269 3432 1343 174? 675 91
2,133 5,701 3,090 ff«
As the Belgian reorganization program gained mo*
mi turn after 1959, hard coal stocks (see Table 9) were
decrease:. Short-time work' was reduced considerably*
and by the end of 1952, It had been eliminated*
In the first decade of the Community, Belgium
was the t ii.> producer of hard coal of the five
Community producers* In regard to 0.:*:.%, Belgium
rated fourth among the five, with Italy last. From
1959 on, Belgium had the fchird highest stocks of coal
with France and Germany in the lead*
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In 1963a Belgium showed a slight increase in out«
put with 21*5 million metric tons being produced*
There was 8 however, no increase in 0»&*S* over the
1962 figure.
The productivity of the mines in the Campine
is the highest in Belgium, averaging 1.5 million tons
per mine* The southern mines are the smallest and
oldest in the Community* Many of these are being
slowly phased out. At the end of 1962, there were
61 mines in operation in the south, with an average
output of 187,000 tons each* ihey produced about
54 percent of the total Belgian coal production*
Table 10 shows the progress of the reorganisa-
58* Ibid,, p* 522; Eleventh General Report ., op«
clt** p. 586*
59, n U,S», 0*&* Coal Exports to the Community




fcion plan,, and the production capacity lost thereby*
TABLE 10.
60
PROGRESS OF R5ORGANIZATION PROGRAM IN BELGIAN COAL MIKING








The closures were highest In the Borinage and
Centre districts. Loss of production in 1359 amounted
to 5.7 million metric tons as a result of short-time
working and pit closures.
Coke production had approximately the same dif-
ficulties as hard coal during the recession and there-
after, .able 11 illustrates the production trends,
and the stockpiling of coke. It is expected that coke
s locks in Belgium will decrease considerably in 1363.
The forecast for Belgian hard coal production in
1975 is approximately SI. 5 million metric tons. Out-
put per man shift for the underground worker is expected
60
• t !
lnt^ . ffcpcrt, on. cit., p. 108$ - :entb
•'••: era! ,' .'sport, 0£. £it., p, 148; seventh C-cnor-5.1 iPort.
5E Mtt" P. 241, —* '
- 76 -

to increase considerably. In 1965 O.M.S* is ex«
pected to increase to 2350 kg, in the Camping and
to 1760 kg. in the south* By 1975* G.M.S* is expected
62
to reach 3200 kg* in the Campine and 2590 in the south*
Productivity is continually rising in the Bel«
gian collieries^ and apparently will continue to do ao
in the future*
TABLE 11.




























(a) Provisi ooal figures.
* 1000 kilograms - 1 metric ton.
lister, op. pit . » p. 101. w *




i,ite> - -- . :*.:. unlxry ,ra- ., oeraus, from che
date or inception
, Have bad ftfci sot
on on© day making the C in
coal. 3 was that steppe d-up coal production
together with a flor. \ ' ' ' i.he C02 ' '.y
toe possible ft r- Ion in Imports from third
countries while still permitting expo. o fcra< * tlo-=-
ai markets*
Be .:*s coal exports v the Community lave
been consi^.. le. our coal exporters in ECSCj
Belgium rank: naany and Holland, m
hard coal exports (s ... ble 12) more than tad
from. 1352 through 1955^ -i crv sharply thereafter.
A leveling off point was re . 1960.
The story of Be i coke exports to the Community
has boen one of fluctuation (see Table 13) with an
overall upward trend* Ihe provisional figure 1981,
however, showed a substantial decline. V.ifch coke pro-
duo tion up a and further decreases in stocks o£ coke
anticipated, the future locks bright for export of
Belgian coke zo jhe Community, m same time, a




BELGIAN TRAPS OF RVBD COAL AND HARD COAL BRIQUETTES WITHIN COM5&KITY
( 'OOO metric tons)
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V J II !_!— -_
1MSS5SS
Year Genaany* ' France/saar* ' Netherlands Total
1952 317 16© 4 490
1953 m% 247 ' 175 1013
1954 1930 331 521 2782
1955 1197 602 356 2155
1956 1160 406 33C 1895
1957 1258 293 405 1956
1958 1826 192 763 2781
1950 2258 dfiri 964 3466
1960 2019 232 834 3085
1961, ,
1962* a '
2206 251 951 3408
2406 8TB 891 3576
(bj For 1960 onarard only for France,
(c) From 1960 onward includes Saar.
64 • Eighth General Report . op . cit . t pp. 394-395; Ninth
General Report , op. cit ., pp. 372-373; Eleventh General Report
,




BELGIAN COKE TRADE WIT'CIN Tin: COMMUNITY.
65
( 'ooo metric tons)
EXPORTS
Year Germany / Italy Prance/ [b) Luxem- Nether- Total
Saar bourg lands
1952 201 j— 197 140 5 543
1953 21 £20 - 102 22 365
1954 1 - 451 102 8 562
15)55 23 - 356 92 27 498
1956 115 — 386 01 33 625
1957 7 1 467 173 36 686
1958 5 1 331 59 14 410
1959 17 16 307 210 « 550
1960 33 90 371 238 m 731
1961
<«)1962 v *'
27 32 397 239 «. 695
20 30 245 230 525
IMFORTS







































From I960 forward figure for France does not include Saar*
After 1960 figure Includes Saar.13
65. Ninth General Report , op . cit ., pp. 374-375; Eleventh
General Report , op . cit., pp. 594-595.
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in sight. rom t s ( mmunity (s .ble 13)
have Increased ten-fold ' ce 1953. Although the
porta 1« a dramatic on©, exports to the
Community ar ice i oat as importa*
£ the Belgian's coal imports
arc a in the production of coke* omestle sup-
ply of coking coal la insufficient*, and not up to she
quality of Ruhr aool, which la used for blending w...
123 coking-coal to s its quality. About 20
percent of tho coal use the coking plants is Sat*
ported, ihir s to about CO percent of ura f s
66
coal imports.
goal fcte Gommunitj . aire more
than tripled since tho Common .rkat«
is has been a c uenae of decreased production
due to pit cloturea, . sub. ...so of
arts from third c: '. Table 12). After
1957, imports I'ror. ' t\ outweighed exports*
....
rapidly cluri ' ! first Be j pa o£ fcranai*
jeriod, ..' then tool-: arp drop in 1956 and
1957, to the CooBaunity
from third count* jd it k In 1957
66, ar* oo« oit«« pp# 27, 42.
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(with 44 million tons) was the primary cause of this
sharp drop In Belgian coal trade*
During the transitional period, subsidies (60
percent of exports were subsidized in 1953 - 1954)
played an important role in developing Belgium's coal
trade with the rest of the Community, especially Yvhen
the demand for coal was slack* The French and Dutch
complained that the export subsidies led to sales of
Belgian coal below the established prices* Although
the High authority did make an adjustment in prices*
its opinion was that the charges were unfounded*
After the subsidies were dropped at the end of
1955, Belgian exports to Italy and France fell*
Belgium maintained, however, a fairly strong export
trade until 195? ^ wh n the coal crisis was triggered
by the continued increase of ^«S* coal imports among
other factors* In 1955, Belgium exports of coke and
coal to the Community in terms of a production per~
centage was 19 percent { by 1968, it had toppled to
9 percent, Buch of the pattern of inter-Community
coal trade hinged on German imports and exports* in
1955 and 1957, when German ( and Dutch ) exports inereas*





oti, Belgian 6XP03Tta uot.u^oddi
because ft£ dsu^IaUui, dAfttuj1 . • l£t L.GA&ian
coal, on ~'o . occ,jjui- j the High Authority Igok
Belgium duo o*1 Lug GoiCisoa - c toi qq&X* X'he do©!**
Q P&strietde uiiru &#U&&e*j .'. _• I wo, iinu I. li.: d
country i«W?WPfc*i fehspougla Co&g&ualtj adu&trifte ints -.1-
giua« it p3*#?enfc$6l t&« ia^iu pua&ois* of &2j.j£ti&$;
r©ajaeated fch&t existing plthsud otooka
iiou b li >wa em bbfi market* ii, preventec purchases
rrom* sad oxces. iwt auxos 1.0, bbti Corawunlfcyj vvLxCu
sight caufafa a shift ui' the iislgl&n coal probleaia i>o
70
uhe other Ueaaaanifcy HUMtb*x*s«
46/59 ca*.iao ioi <tuutas ©oneeraing t&e deliveries
of coal smo&g the Casmunity oouzitJPi©** ^a^ort licensss
were 00 ue i&suec; oj bhs Belgian got . v the
control oi the. Bigb Au ;y» -mpoi'-s were liiaited
to 1*945 Klllloa dbw^o tons and exports to 2*95
VI
million taetrio ^>,us.
..uvi. uuuo Belgium ooal g&s out t q ..rket,
&• ^-itixcui ^ovemaent took steps to put its me
iioua© 1st ci-Mui -v oysJL deoreest
Qi OP« Qtt « $ P*
.-. §1 'Qi- ortj oj> cit ^i j • 153*
71» lb-id.*
,
..* i- • 1
S3

1. The first decree on 30 December 1959 set
down the scope of the plan to implement Decision No.
46/59, and the details of the procedures to be
followed,
2. The second decree made it obligatory for
importers to comply with the scheme laid down by the
government under the terms of the High Authority*
3. The third defined the terms of deliveries
of coal to and from Belgium.
4. The fourth dealt with the regulating of
de-stocking (only a portion of about 20 percent of
72
the existing coal stocks iras to be put on the market).
In 1960j the High Authority took the first step
towards the eventual reintegration of Belgian coal in
the Common Market, I& its Decision Ho. 24/60 a it
increased the Belgian Import quotas from the Community
to S.05 million tons* Then again "> 20 Deccnber 1950
in its Decision Ho. BS/60j bhe High erlfcjf authorized
for 1961 an increase of trade of 3.3 percent in- the
Community over the 1959 decision. The quota xiaz in-
to 3.152 million bona and could be changed
on a ton«for~ton basis after consultation.
• Cj * , V -
- G4 -

lu ifc* Bft«l*l«B to* IS/Si Of IS .bci- 1961,
... Authority r g 4 pcr-
... a i« - ... . vt>ifc> for ia a -a ldc2 ( 3.276
million bona) | ablla ..... . froo m -o
L ty remains . uagecU Quotas could be
die..
. aa uu.w-o with roval of the Belgian
74
a&t and tfca - bority*
High . . ... Decision t»o. Vs^ authorised
20,000 ten* oi GhNttsa anthracite in excess of the
75
quowu to fee t»o . uottf
Bee* aal tduotry bad dona




on 2^ Julj 1962 iDecieion o. 8/62) authorised from
1 ,. it on sue . tbraeito and iow-voJla-
oiie coal and briquette* i tats *
«:&*$ «iao au. &e lnereaa* in i haru«*coal
uuo Community oa«orxiit Belfi
pereeat ue a total at SU2 salliien metric tana for
1968* wj.b^cu. export quotas ba feba Com tfcy *?>-
alao inereaeed xu peroent £or 1962 ( a totf ~ , ^22
76
Billion iUOL-x-^-e ow:s.)
Jn 1 January 1963, Iho Igh .-. .. y discontinu-
251,
il He porta ©£• c 1 . « . 207
«
75# Eleventh Annual y.t j P« cit., pp« 250«
76. Xbl4»i p« 252.
85 -

ed limitations of trade In giuxa
77
Coiaraunity* Belgium one* • -
Eifcilisy for her I &«
trade with ^hirci Countries * Coal production in
_.Lu not supply the great demand for
al during the transitional period, ,ird country
porta >erej.ore necessary* During this period,
the quaatiion was often asKed: "Who would import the




" xhe enswer was not forthcoming
fro Ltfjp until the ooal crisis sot in»
.,_ ...o Belgium from third countries rose
com ably (see laola 14} after 1953* They reached
»ak in 1^66 with 13,682,000 metric tons* I he
largest oeuntry exporter of coal to Belgium is
the Hi js« In 1956c. rican coal accounted
for 34 percent of sne total third country imports* and
1 1962, for i 1 percent. Most of this coal is used
for BaJdl ;ie* ooal imports from third countries «•
lar3 t united States, Great Britain and Po-
land - wore cut orastically during the coal crisis*
iha , -us iiave oeen vary protective about, their
coal* ir pri • -easuros have net been effective,





BrlGIAN mm COAL TRADE WITH THIRD COUNTRIES
(
, 000 raetric tons)'
79
IMPORTS
Year U.S.A. U.K. Pol as
1952 7377 482 9
1953 644 420 -
1954 1823 1633 262
1055 6998 1339 714
1956 11,486 1099 803.
1957 2138 564 33
1958 1879 389 11
tM 1051 348 1
I960 800 132 -
1961 668 134 top
1962 894 273 *





















Tear tuu Scandi- Switzer- Aastr
navia land
. jy 139 50 «.
192 00 50 2
-11 132 230 1
1537 116 348
747 107 300
616 77 :c: tin
ovo 17 77 -
93 5 238 1
•«• 43 267 11
«, 159 280 9





































79 * Sixth General Report , Vol. II, 0£. cjlt., pp. 318-319;
Eighth General Report , o.> . cit., pp. 388, 390? Ninth General Report ,
op . cit ., p. 368 j Tenth General Report , op . cit ., pp. 524-525
;
Eleventh General Report, op . cit ., pp. 589-590.
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however. During the economic boom from 1955 to 1957,
private merchants imported American coal # which is
cheaper - duty free, r:hen the recession hit, license
controls were placed on American imports, but these
controls prove d ineffective, because a large quantity
of coal had been purchased on long-term contracts.
During the first half of 1958, one million tons of
80
American coal were imported.
Import licenses were not the answer. j?he problem
was not only one of limiting imports, but also one of
expanding exports. ,.he Belgian government proposed
that Article 58 of the Treaty be invoked. It would
have authorized the imposing of import and production
quotas throughout the Community. Is proposal had
been made a number of times by the Belgian government
and by the High Authority, but It was rejected on each
81
occasion by the Council of Ministers.
The Belgian government, therefore, took its own
measures and imposed Import controls on the Community
members to prevent imports of third country coal from
passing through the Community countries into Belgium.
Belgium maintained a fairly scrong export coal
trace to third countries until 1958 (see iable 14).
Since 1955, Belgium's peak year, exports began to fall
80. Lister, j>£. clt .» p. 328.




COKE EXPERTS TO THIRT) COUNTRIES
T7000 metric tons)
Year Scandi- Switzer- Austria Others Total
navia land
1952 200 43 172 415
1953 337 17 9 93 456
1954 165 17 7 137 326
1955 206 8 1 63 278
1950 283 12 5 300
1957 197 11 - 9 217
1958 464 3 3 18 488
1959 266 6 1 23 296
1960 185 12 2 59 257
19 ei 148 6 2 22 179
1962 IOC 15 2 15 132
slowly at first* and then sharply in 1959* Since
then, the export market has shown signs of improve-
merit 9 returning to the level it was at in 1957. Th©
loss of the British market after 1958 was the primary
cause of reduced exports* However^ since 1959
improvements in other and new markets have once again
increased Belgium's hard coal export trade*
Coal exports on the other hand (see Table 15)
have shown a generally decreasing trend. Of the
five coke exporters in the Community, Belgium ranked
fourth in 1961 and 1962 #
In 1955, exports of coal and coke to third coun«
88 • Eighth General Reporta Qi> » cit .a p« 592? Kinth
Creneral Report ,, cj£« cit»> p« 570; Tenth General Heport
op . cit .fl p« t>26$ Eleventh Perioral Re port s op * cit « « p*59,
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tries as a percentage of production was 9 percent*
3y 1962 s it had cropped to 3 percent.
When Article 37 of the .Treaty was invoked in
December 1969 in favor of Belgium (Decision iio. 46/59),
restrictions were placed on imports from third count-
ries. Belgium was authorized to import 800,000 metric
tons of coal - exclusive of coking-coal imported for
processing - from third countries during I960.
Imports • exclusive of coking-coal for processing •
did not reach the limit set. Licenses were issued
for only 525,000 metric tons. In addition, 380,000
metric tons were imported for processing and re-oxport-
84
ing.
The limit on imports from third countries was
85
increased to 620,000 metric tons for 1961. On 13
December 1961, the import quota from third countries
86
was increased to 640,000 metric tons.
Aa the Belgian coal industry was showing signs
of improvement in 1961, the high Authority on 1 August
1962 authorised one imports from third countries to
83. jJip:hth General Report * op . cit .» p. 153-155.
84 • ^inth General Reports ojj« ci t
»
, P. 111.
85, Ibid ., p. 114."
°6.
'




be raised to 688,000 metric ions Tor 1962. Imports
of hard coal and hard-coal briquet tea from third
countries could not exceed 527,000 metric tons, ex-
clusive of the types and grades takes off the restrict-
ed list, for intra-Community trade. Imports actually
delivered amounted to 94*3 percent of this figure*
The total Belgian imports of the de-restricted grades
above the quota set in December 1961 totaled 310,000
metric tons of which two-thirds was procured from
third countries, because of a shortage within the
Community. These imports were for household use.
On 1 January 1965, with the emergency over,
limitations on imports from thirc countries were dis-
continued by the High Authority*
The most recent reports from the Community's
statistical office show that imports of coal into th©
Community in 1963 increased by 10 million metric tons
over the 1962 figure. Of this, 6 million was estimated
to come from the bnited States, and about 2.2 million
from Great Britain. Increased imports were necessary to
compensate for falling coal production in the
88
Community.








Subsidies played a dual role in the reorganiza-
tion program for the sagging Belgian coal industry,
fhey absorbed t;he difference between high Belgian
coal prices and lower Community prices thus sparing
the Belgian collieries from uisoress. -hey helped
in the modernization process*
The Treaty expressly forbids the use of sub-
89
sidles in "any form whatsoever. w B-oweverj, because
the immediate removal of trade barriers would have
dealt a severe blow to the Belgian coal industry* it
was decided that during the transitional period a more
gradual removal of subsidies was necessary* ^hese
subsidies, controlled by the &igh Authority* were
intended to bring about this smooth transition. This
was one of the basic compromises that made it possible
90
for Belgium to accept the Treaty.
Section 26 of the Convention for the Transitional
Period spells out the terms of the special position
of the Belgian mines during the transitional period.
^ 9 « -••- c>^
... -1> OP * ciU , pa 12.
90. Dietold, 0£. pit. j p» 195.
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In order to Integrate the Belgian collieries into
the Common Market for coal, it provides for limits of
production capacity that could be retired each year*
It gave Belgian coal protection from other areas in
the Community, particularly the Ruhr* Jhls special
position was to come to an on6 in February 1958, The
provision for the cutting down of procuction capacity
was not carriec. out in earnest until 1957, because
SI
of the scarcity of coal*
Section 25 of the Convention sets forth the com*
pensation levies for the financing of the integration
measures.
-he Convention offered the Belgian government
two choices for the transitional periods (The Belgian
92
government accepted the first plan*)
1* n,Aie payment of compensation, financed and
administered in ace or-dance with the details laid down
In Section 25 (Section 26, 2), or
2. "The temporary separation of the Belgian mar«
ket from the Common Market (Seevion 26, 5). n
Compensation payments under Section 26 were de-
signed to:
1, ^uke iu ^ossicle zo oring the Belgian coal
91. Lister, jD£. cit .» p. 117.




prices as close as possible into line with the Common
Market (Section 26, 2, a)
•
2* deduce prices of Belgian coal which was con-
sumed by the Belgian coal and steel industry (Section
26, 2, b), ver put into operation.)
3, Offset somewhat tihe losses resulting from the
93
sale of coal within the Community (Section 26, 2,c)»
Before the Common Market for coal was established
on 10 February 1953, the Belgian government had paid
contractual subsidies to the collieries which amounted
to Bfr 200 million annually. These subsidies were
94
used mainly to assist the Borlnage district*
In order to continue subsidy payments, with High
Authority assistance under the Convention, pereq.ua tlon
measures were taken. The purpose of the perequation
levy was 5
As regards the Belgian mining industry the
perequation levy is intended to reconcile
the prices of the Belgian coal with those of
the Common Market, so that at the end of the
transition period, these prices will approxi-
mate to the estimated cost of production. 95
In sotting up the perequation levy, it had to b©
determined which wines would pay the levy; how much
of the tonnage would be levied; and hew much the levy
95, Ibid ., p. ?9.
94, E'CSC, First ueneral .' o^ort on the Activities
of the
,
Community (Luxembourg t 1953), p* 83; Meade, op ,
cit , p. £93.
95, J-'irst General Report , 0£. cit », p. 83,
I -

would be per ton. It was decided that the lev:; was
to be made on tha producers* average receipts* i.e.
the selling prxee, less taci.es. Only Germany and the
iMetherlands had production cos is below the Community
average* It was uharefore agreed that these two
96
countries would pay the perequation levy.
In determining the amount of subsidies to bo paid
to the Belgian coal Industry, the High Authority set
the maximum prices for Belgian coal below its previous
price levels, arid then calculated the difference to
be provide u as subsidies* -his average difference
came to 3fr 29 pep metric ton* This subsidy would
increase the income of the producers. Unc.eT the terms
of the subsidy tho government would foe allowed to
decide on the methods end i .pes of investment for mod-
97
emization.
.he rate of the levy was set at 1.1 percent for
1953. The upper limit authorised in the Convention
was 1.5 percent , and was to be lowered by 20 percent
each year thereafter. The levy was accordingly re*
duced each year, and by uhe end of 1S57 was removed
on schedule* The Dutch paid until April 1957 and the
Germans continued until the end of that year.
96. ibid ., pp* 52-55.
97* Diebold, *j>« clt., p. 206.




On 7 February 1965, the High Authority notified
German and Dutch i-overnnenfcs that the perequation
levy would start on 10 February when the Common Market
99
for coal commence' :.
Two forms of support in the form of eubs.id5.es were
thereafter approve ci
1. "-he general subsidies which allowed the
Belgian producers to lower the5.r prices."
2. .'he continuation of "contractual subsidies
paid io certain mines to cover their working losses
100
and to enable them to carry out modernisation programs."
,h the coal recession that followed in 1953
and 1954, the Belgian high-cost coal was the first to
be discriminated against on the coal market. This
crisis threatened to result in large stocks piling
up at the pits, Therefore, it was necessary to allo-
cate ae^itional subsidies on Belgian coal exports. The
Convention authorlzed this, rhe High Authority paid
80 percent of the difference in delivery price of tho
Belgian coal export; d and the local price level. The
Belgian government paid the balance. Consequently, the
amount paid in subsidies per ton varied with the par-
ticular transact! Oil. A sizeable quantity of uhe total
» First Saneral Report, op * alt*, p.





This subsidy wus introduced in June 1955. The
total tonnage subsidized under this pain in 1953 was
1,042 thousand tons with an average payment of Bfr 91
102
per ton. This subsidy was discontinued in 1955*
Under the subsidy program providing for the pay-
ment of Bfr 2S per ton of coal mined, it was aeemed
that a total of Bfr 1,100 million would be required*
It was also expected that an additional reserve of
Bfr 250 million would be needed to compensate for any
adjustment in the tailing prices. The total of this
assistance was to be paid as follows;
1. by the Belgian government, Bfr 475 million
plus the Bfr 200 million which it had been paying.
2. by the Germans and .Uitch, B£r 675 million.
103
These payments commenced on 15 March 1955*
The concession actually paid averaged only Bfr 18
per metric ton for the Belgian consumer if the removal
104
of double pricing is taken into account.
By the era of 1S53, the total subsidies paid to
the Belgian coal industry amounted to Bfr 905. 8 million.
The High Authority paid for half of this total.
101. Ibid., p. 294.
2-02. iFId".
100. Flrat Gfenoral Report, op. cit., p. S5.




Before taking Into account subsidy payments in
1953* the Belgian coal industry had a loss of Bfr 430
million. The southern Belgium mines were in the red
Bfr 1,000 million. This high loss was off set by the
105
profit of Bfr 570 million shown in the Campine.
The Convention did not specify where the subsidies
should go. Since the same payment per ton of coal
produced was applied to all mines, a large part of
the support went to the more efficient mines in the
106
Campine.
The same financial assistance was continued In
1954. On 13 March 1954, the High Authority authorized
payments of an "additional convention assistance"
amounting to Bfr 190 million over and above the pre-
vious year* A supporting fund of Bfr 1<20 million was
also authorized in accordance with Section 24, 3, b.
The supporting fund was to be "supplied on a fifty-
fifty basis by the producers and the Belgian govern-
ment*" The Com.'!.unity was to pay for 50 percent of
the Convention assistance and Bfr 45 million as Its
share of the additional Convention assistance and the
107
supporting fund*
Under this system it should be noted that the
105. Lister, 0£. cit . , p* 117| Meade, 0£. cit .,
p. 294*
106. Ibid ., p. 295.




general subsidy was paid to the Belgian collieries
whether the pit was profitable or not,
A Joint Commission was set up in 1954 by the High
Authority consisting of High Authority representatives
and the Belgian government to investigate the progress
of integration and the effectiveness of the compensa-
tion program.
The Commission concluded that flat-rate subsidies
were not conducive to stimulating the Belgian moderni-
zation program and making its coal competitive in the
Community,
Basing its decision Bo, 22/55 of 28 May 1955 on
the Commission's findings* the High Authority made
its first major change in compensation payments to
108
Belgium, Prom 16 June 1955* the following changes
were to be put in effects
1* Compensation payments were discontinued to
those grades of coal which could be sold in the Common
Market without special assistance (Low-volatile coal
over 10 mm in size and semi-bituminous coal over 20 mm
in size),
2, Compensation payments were trimmed for those
collieries in a more profitable position » by reason
of coal mining conditions - and which could in the
106, Meade 8 o£. olt , 9 p, 295,
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future compete In the Coition Market with reduced
assistance*
3* The Convention assistance paid by the Belgian
government to the Borinage collieries (Bfr 200 million)
was reappropriated for general compensation require-
ments*
4. "Any difference between the yield of the
compensation levy plus the equal contribution from the
Belgian government **.and the amount required to cover
payments under the new arrangements •••was to be used
to help cover supplementary assistance for the Borinage* 51
5* Bfr 180 million was set aside to reduce the
109
prices of certain industrial grades of eoal*
The grades of coal which were removed from the
compensation scheme amounted tc about one-third of
110
the Belgian coal output.
This new compensation scheme remained In effect
until 9 February 1956 » In Implementing the nsw scheme*
the High Authority encouraged ;he Belgian government
to finance and supervise re-equipment and moderniza-
tion programs for the coal mines. It further suggested
compensation payment 3hould be withheld from those
109. Slx.h General Report * Vol* II, ££* cit **
p. 34*
110. Diebold, o^. cit *, p. 206*
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collier5.es which failed to cooperate in these prog-
rams* 10 start the ball rolling, the Belgian govern-
ment passed a law on 12 July 1955 providing for
credits to collieries amounting to Bfr 4-5000 million,
111
which included Efr 1,100 million for the Borinage alone*
As a result of this change in compensation system,
the Belgian pits fell into three categories*
1» Those receiving normal compensation payments.
2. '.those receiving reducec compensation payments,
because ,hey were able to face Common Market competition
with les.u help* (the Uharbonnages de Deeringen, the
Charbonnaces oe iielchteren et Zolder and the Charbonnages
de Houthalen - all in the Gampine)*
3. Those receiving subsidies because of reorgani-
zation, "over and above the normal compensation pay-
112
ments."
The importance of this new scheme was that it
introduced the principle of selectivity. The Belgian
coal industry was generally critical of the new arrange-
113
meiit.
In making compensation payments selective, sub-
sidies were made to depend on the financial position
111. Sixth L-eneral Report Vol. II", op . pit .,*
p. 31*




of the various basins. It also linked subsidies more
closely to modernization and reorganization schemes*
A plan for specific subsidies to named enterprises
was set up*
In 1955, the four principle coal companies in the
Borinr.ge ( C barbonnages beiges* du Levant, de 1* Guest
de Mori3, and du Hainaut) were budgeted a total of Bfr
403.5 million for re-equipment and modernization un-
der i;his compensation scheme, 91th High Authority
agreement, this figure was exceeded by Bfr 18.7 million.
I' or 1958, subsidies authorized wore 30 1 at Bfr 351
million, but were later raised to Bfr 525.9 million*
In 1957, the subsidies to be paid were set at Bfr 337*2
million. Bfr 200 million were to bo paid by the
Community as its share of the reorganization program
of the Borinag* (Bfr 130 million was to come from the
compensation levy, 70 million from the readaption fund.)
The total Convention assistance paid by the Community
to f Leance the reorganization scheme for the Borinage
114
from 1953-1953 was Bfr 539.4 million.
The special subsidy under Section 26,2, c, cover-
ing Belgian coal exports to the Community were drop-
ped on 1 April 1955. During this period, the High
114. .Fourth General H g g or t on the ctivitie s
of the Community (luxembourgx 1956), p. 123} Sixth
Qeneral Be port , Vol* II, j>2» oit *, p* 34*
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Authority examined the quarterly sales schedules of
Belgian coal and then notified the Sales Ageacy,COBECHAR,
oi' the tonnages, types and grades of coal which were
to receive compensation payments, ihe quarterly schedules
showed that 4»8 million metric tons had been exported
by Belgium, The cost of the compensation was borne
by the Community and the Belgian government on a fifty
fifty basis* xhe Community share of the export com-
pensation program during its existence totalled Bfr
115
257*7 million,
-he reduction of the perequation lovy on 10 Feb-
ruary 1956 made it necessary to reduce compensation
rates without altering the syscem of compensations
until 31 December 1956.
Production costs went up as a r esult of uhe shorter
work week won by Belgian labor, the Belgian government
absorbed this increase through special payments to
the industry. During 1956, these amounted to Bfr
116
557 million, and in 1957 to Bfr 214 million.
By 1956, the overall financial position of the
southern districts had improved, although some pits
were still in bad shape, ^uring 1956 and 1957, sub-
115. Sixuh General Re; port s Vol. I" , ojj* clt .a
pp. 35-56.
116. 9, op. cit.j p. 298.
- 103 -

sidles remained high; the weaker mines receiving more
and more a larger wedge of the subsidy pie, Efforts
on modernization and rehabilitation also were begin-
ning to boar fruit
•
On further investigation of the economic position
of the Belgian mines, n the principle of selectivi
was applied on a general scale." rx'his second change
in the compensation parents scheme divided the Belgian
collieries into three groups!
1. :je pits which did not require further
assistance.
2. iose pits which showed promise of hecoraing
competitive by the end of the transitional period.
3. ;ose pits which could not be integrated bv
117
the end of the transitional period*
Group 1 embraced 50 percent of the total coal
output in Belgium. Compensation payments to these pits
were discontinued on 1 January 1957. Group 2 covered
40 percent of the total coal output in Belgium. From
1 January 19-57 to the end of the transitional period,
compensation payments were made for financial losses
incurred, instead of payment on the basis of so much
per ton sold. It was anticipated that subsidies might still




be required for this
.
pi ap after the transitional period,
d-roup S Included the four collieries in the Borinage
region (about 10 percent of the total Belgian output).
Compensation to this group was discontinued after 10
February 1957*
-hose new compensation payments were paid on a
calculation of expected losses based on the 1956 pro-
duction, and prices were fixed by the High Authority.
If the coal companies put in a better performance
than was expected of them, they could keep the diff-
erence in aid as added incentive* However, to quali-
fy for the aid in the first place, fchsy had to carry
cut the modernization programs* subject to Iinspection
by the High Authority and the Belgian government. The
Belgian government was authorized to pay additional
subsidies to specific collieries, which included the
four Borlnage mines which no longer received general
subsidies* The new scheme was Initiated because J
!• it was necessary to give further incentive
for more efficient operation of the Belgian collieries.
2. A3 yet, the Belgian coal i.dustry had made
little progress fee ensure complete integration by the
i of the transltlonal period.
^•ls » 1M£«? K#&3»< ££* pit., pp. 296-297.
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$4 -he ability of the Community bo con bin
icing aid was declining rapidy.
Ihfl . ;,ral subsi a;., ^coiic OSBM tC an srid on 10
aruary 1958. -able 16 shows in detail the £otal
subsidies pale ^o the Bel collieries during the
transitional period* Special subsidies were continued
thereafter, but these were paid exclusively oy che
-gian government*
the end of t aansitiorial period, the
Belgian coal industry still had its troubles, -here were
many contributing causes. Chief among them was the fact
that the Belgian government, labor, ana industry con-
tributed go slowing up uhe adaption program* Ihsy
were afraid of moving forward too quickly lest whole-
sale unemployment result*
r
_here was a strong demand for coal until 1957,
which reduced pressures for cutting costs, -he high
..land gave the non-competitive Belgian mines a re-
prieve, but inhibits... adaption.
Even in Belgium the soiling price of Belgian
coal was higher uhan that of the major competing col-
lieries in the Common -ar-.ct. iity of the in-
dustry fe* command high prices for its high quality coal
also alleviated the problem somewhat. Subsidise on ex-
ports ha^ fro... the '.. - • -a export nor-





119 # Seventh General Report , op» cit >, pp« 538-359«
- 107 -

coal fell off in the C ;#
. subsidy prograia drew the Sigh Authority deep-
ly into the Belgian <: . It £ave the High -Authority
In flying joiling prices and In setting into
motion the program .Cor organisational a<r tenfes* fcfea
Line i-. daaand fa* coal during the crisis which
an In 1956 increased the pressures for adaption. By
•ly 1959, it appeared as though the balance v/as be-
ginning to shift towards adjustment and the closing
i of the less profitable pits.
rrea major points about the subsidy scheme dur-
ing the transitional puriod arc •./orthy of note:
1* era was no decidL Sty downward trend in the
total amount of : : 3 to the collieries* The
ph\\ - 1953 ' ..r ' ' 1,040 niliio.,. ! qv the
tran I .->nal period It averaged Bf* 1,500 million*
2. General subsidies declined sharply over the
riodi in 1953 general subsidies amounted to 71 per-
it of the total aa - [82 percent if export sub-
sidiaa l )• in 1357, fchey had reduced to
49 percent. ' } tract subsidies to
specific collier! orre spending increase*
0. Th* Vi id by the High Authority In
conpensauion aid decline; hout. the period ;ith the
hare fJ aaant rising accord -»
initially, hot! paid 50 percent each* Ey 1957 the
108 -

High Authority was paying 24 rcentj the Belgian
120
govej^riiae.TC 76 percent.
0£ the $$6*8 million collected by the High Author-
ity during she transitional period for s Las, $46*4
121
Bullion wont to Belgium and the remainder to Italy
•
On 14 May 1959;, the Council of ministers agreed
to the following measures in regard to the Belgian pits t
1. The schedule prices of the Belgian coal were to
be lowered by moans of government subsidies In accordance
with Seetiett 26, 4 of the Convention.
2. The High Authority granted readaption aid
( under Section 23) tat order to oase the blow of unem*
ploymont as pits were closed during the reorganisation
program.
3* The financial assistance paid to miners on
122
short time work was extended until 30 September 1959*
On 31 June 1959 the .ouxCil approved a Bigfc
Authority proposal to allow the Belgian government
under Section 26, 1 of the Convention to subsidize
123
eight million metric tons during 1959 #
i'he Belgian government vat due to submit new sub-
3idy proposal* to the High Authority during the first
half of 1960, but procrastinated until September I960,
.120 • I 8, 0P < Cit>j p* 290.
121. Id, ©£* cit,, p, ?04.
122 • -^ipxhtfa . General Report s op . cit. a p. 130.
123. Ibia^ i p. I36*
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which time it applied for Bfr 600 million, ror
,
1960 the Belgian government was authorized to ray sub-
sidies of Bfr 683 million on the production of 4.2
million metric tons.
The subsidies were to be payable only to col-
lieries called upon to bear a " onal opera-
ting costs as a re suit of neutral conditio
in the • and of obvious, JLffibala
further burdening their costs.
^
At the some time the High Authority took under
consideration the Belgian subsidy proposal for 1961*
Ob 11 'November I960, the Council ga^e it its stomp
of approval.
under the new decision, Bfr 400 million were
authorised for subsidy parents on 3.3 million metric
tons of coal produced in southern Belgium. As a price
for these subsidies, however, the colliories had to
continue modernization and closure programs. Subsidies
125
were to be fixed quarterly.
In 1061, subsidies actually paid amounted to
Bfr 380 million, of which Bfr 66 Million were in the form
of "repayable advances." These subsidies were paid
126
on 4.1 million metric tons produced.
The Belgian government, in its new subsidy pro-
posals was of the opinion that Bfr 250 million for
r , Hintfe Qeneral Re port » op. jsit. , pp. 116-117.
125. '.ibiTTj'""?. lie."
126. .tenth general Ho port a o,p* clt . « p, 161.
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$£ am 100 rail ' rould 'ce. Sato*
127
at,Ion thereafter would be cropped.
LtotIon with the Council, High Author-
ecision Bo* 10/62 granted EV.bsid5.es to only four
collieries against a previous eight for 1961. Bo ro-
payable advances vere granted. Subsidies in 1962
amounted to Bfr 115 million and v?ere on a little
128
over 1.7 r.iliion metric tons.
or 1965, as mentioned above, the Ian govern*
ided Bfr 100 million to subsidize 1*1 mil-
lion metric tons. i Belgian government predicted
uhab not otev Bfr 50 million of this figure would ?c-
129
. iy be spent.
v. mm
Lgian pits, past and present, have boon the
recipients of a higher capital investment rote than
any of the o^hor pits in the CohTmunity.
)l04 17 load 13 sho* the capital investments
Ide in the Bol^ian collieries.
in 1953, to put into operation a one million ton
127. lbla.
12R. Eleventh oneral Feport... op. cit., po. 264-
265.











INVESTMENTS BY COAL BASIN
(t'OOO, 000)
131
1054 1955 1056 1957 1958
.81 .72 .96 .85
1050
EVRD COAL COLLIERIES
Campine 18.45 12.87 17.20 18.33 17.01 9.52
Southern Belgium 24.58 22.87 25.19 27.22 21.46 13.81
Total 88.03 35.74 42.39 46.55 38.47 22.33







































Overall Total 46.96 41.01 57.98 S2.03 65.72 51.79
(a) Estimated figures.
(b) Pithead power-stations proper and other power-generating
plants at the mines.
131. Eleventh General Report, o^ . cit., pp. 39, 11-42.
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31.14 02.80 33.62 21.57

a* with a life expectancy of fifty years required
an outlay of illlioj , e fifty year dura-
tion t ; fercnco to n *»i en I B¥ Tea ee^ets
B and galleries, but not machinery. For
more eff:*c"' - ir.es* shafts »C llerios arc re-
pla norfl otft bfiji f fifty yeere,* ffea i eve
project cost am m MP i fttiM rati
I r-piant with a life-c clo cf about tvon~'
ars, be' g obsolete at the rate cf 5 percent icr
132
year*
-^nredi: after the Second world War the Bel«
gian government undertook a S522 IXlit&i li nt
program which was to cc ' 1956 » ?he
program Bought to lessen "urn's reliance on coal
and to m&i irration * at all
costs*" .vv.it, "i: cut costs and rsise
133
productivity without se-orif" listion.*"
;nts wore higfa in both the Campin-
southern I o the e- Labment of
the C irkot fa* coal. Ill 1952, B r 2,270
million was inv stcd in the coal mines. On the Bf«
of a the Common haricot, the re-eq nt
program a was subs :- 3fr 13 billion*
' V f °P* Pit . a p* 105
«
153 . T 3 taropeaj '- ani Steel Community, Fart I
)ss ai & Vol, 9 Dollego Park*
Md.: .bureau of Business ana ftoonomle Research, 1955), p# 9.
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of which bfr 5.4 billion was prov " hy the pre* ... rs.
From 1952 to L956| , ver-
|S5 million per :oar, of trhieh |39 million were
in-. .' i lining division* Subsidies palo by
f and . . Igj i©nt froia 1953 to
1956 r tsd 59 percent >£ the total fundi invested
in all divisions* A total of $150 was a| p~
ristod to the r. division, sj 00 milli- &*
other divisions, -^ne mine owners were supposed bo
the subsidies for c. I ml tments*
On 23 April 1954 the United States granted a
0 million loan :o uhe Community. Of this, |60 million
was all oca tec i ibcr 1954* In 1955 # lllion
135
of th' :3 set si - for tl coal a.
In 1955, t oritv was also be!
.
to
.s.ruc. i: : of a gas*pro< . g plant
156
. Lag low . seal i. Liege ei*ea«
wntil 1957, high prices and larc Je
coal operations » * J l^ian coal firms
had Liorc i.io :ey for : P&mSj however, they
were riding the crest of a s and lit*
-Ic jnthaaiasn Tor i... elosi wn
...a least
.
?its. Although Invea - -a
104. DistSTj OP, Sit»«. p. 119| SJA .a .' neral
. eport . '. . I , jj,i •; i t . j p. 34.
135.
, £2. cit.j pp« oc,97.




high and some oits were elc: ' n«
the productivity of their nines in 1958 re.tr '
third below that of the major fields in the Qoiimunit
as a whole.
One of the chief shortconi iga in the Belgian coal
industry has been the Isck of suff f Llitien
for Increasing the rate of productivity. These facilities
include such items as electrical power-pl&nta at pit-
heads. Another weakness is the 1**3 a *©*
ouctioa facilities for secondary products such as coke
and briquettes* In other areas of the Coi^unity o
greater portion of the investments is earmarked f-
137
electrical power and co be*
Professor Fernand Dehousse, a spokesman for
the coal miners in the Assembly of the Community,
pointed out that I
Progress in Europe has often in the past been
hindered by the desire to keep in operation
even obsolete equipment end unprofitable enter-
ises because of the very legitimate foar
of unemployment.2-38
From 1956 on, pithead power-station investments
showed a marked - albeit belated < increase, particu-
larly in the south* These investments f«l*a to continue.
ring the transitional period, investment expen-
137 « Lister, g . Pit*, p« 1£0$ Meade, 0J>. cU ti
p* 300.
1-58. Mason, op. cit., pp. 99*100.
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ditures came to Bfr 9.8 billion, ?/htch was about 50
percent more than the total subsidy payments* Al-
though the investments were quite high* the efficiency
of the pits $ measured in 0#M.S. 5 increased only slow-
ly, with the gap between Belgium and the other Com-
munity countries widening a little*
The Campin© mines improved* however* the south-
ern mines fell behind* Some of the less efficient pits
were closed. The failure of the southern mines to
catch up was* all in all* very disappointing when the
size of the investments is taken into consideration.
These investments amounted to $1*33 per ton from 195S
to 1957* and #1.57 per ton in 1957. This was the
139
highest in the Community with Italy included*
After the transitional period^ capital investment
decreased. By 1960 they amounted to only half of the
1958 figure. After 1960 9 investments increased slight-
ly. In 1963* the capital investments dipped to about
two-thirds of the 1962 figure.
The trends in the investment programs have fol-
lowed a pattern similar to the trends in the compen-
sation scheme. As long as subsidies were high* invest-
ments were high. When subsidies dropped^ and the coal
industry showed improved health* investment dropped.




COBECHAR , The sole Belgian corI cartel Is the
Cosnptoire Beige des Charbons (COBECHAR), organized
In 1934, It is a coal sales agenoy which contracts
for a significant portion of the open-market coal
sales of the Belgian producers* CG.bEC.HAR markets
about half of the Belgian output and deals mainly
with big consumers* The prices and terms set by
COBECHAR generally set the pattern for the Industry,
COBECHAR is analogous to GSORG - the Ruhr coal
selling agency.
In April 1954, Franz Etsel, then vice-president
of the High Authority, made known to the Assembly that
he had notified COBECHAR that it was in violation of
140
Article 65 of the Treaty,
In 1955 and 1956, negotiations with the High
Authority led to some changes in organization and a
modus operandi to bring it in line with the provi-
sions of the Treaty* In these negotiations, the High
Authority was not concerned about the amount of coal
sold through COBECHAR (which amounted to about 7 per-
cent of the Community production in 1956), but rather
140. Mason, o£* cit*, p* 78, Article 65 of




about the maimer in whioh it should operate to improve
production and distribution. It was to take on the
141
same functions authorized to preserve GEORG*
The Belgians had considered COBECHAR as just an-
other commercial enterprise. Virtually all the Bel-
gian coal firms are represented^ each having capital
shares and voting rights in proportion to their pro-
duction. The Societe General© and the Launoit groups
control a large part of the industry* In recognition
of this, the presidency of COBECHAR alternates between
these two firms each year*
In October 1956, the High Authority authorized
(Decision Ho. 30/56 - later amended by Decision Ko*
27/57) the Belgian coal firms to operate through CO-
BECHAR. In turn, COBECHAR was authorized to:
1. Fix prices and sales conditions for all sales,
2. Fix rules for delivery terms, delivery
points, discounts, and long term contracts*
3* Sell to Italian customers until 1958, unless
the Italians voiced their preference for using a pri-
vate merchant instead*
141. Diebold, o£. cit*,p» 596J Sixth General
Report , Vol* I, jop* ci"£T« p* 78* See Fourth General
Report on the Activities of the Community, April 1956,
No* 133, and Fifth Gene"raT~Report on the Activities
of the Community ,, April 1957, Nos*"T52 to 159*
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In addition, COBECHAR lost its exclusive sales rights
142
in Franc© and Luxembourg.
COBECHAR is not empowered to control production;
however, it r,i t>.y move to equalise employment and dis*
tribute orders when there is idle capacity* This rule
is primarily designed to safeguard the small indepen-
dent producers* All mining firms had a voice In set*
143
ting coal prices*
"The mining firms may sell to other customers*
to firms that own 75 percent of the capital and to ny
consumers that have bought from the mines on long term
contracts*" The firms may sell directly or through a
middle-man* If COBECHAR fixes the rules for the sales
to merchants* it must first get the High Authority*
s
approval* The decision of the High Authority gave
the customer the option of taking delivery at the mine.,
at an inland port* or at Antwerp* and arranging for
144
his own transportation*
In 1956 and 1957, C0B3CHAK handled the sales on
17 million metric tons out of the 23 million available
for sale* The mining firms handled the remainder on
their own*
In December 1958* COEECHAR was informed that the
142. Lister, o£. cit • , p. 279.
143* Ibid *
144. ' ;Id., pp. 279-280.
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High Authority was going to change Its authorization.
Officials from fchs High Authority and COBUCHAR met in
Brussels vo examine the organisation an J sales
policies* On 9 February 1757, C Jut applied for
its new authorization; but the application was later
withdrawn because of the reorganisation neasures tak~
145
tag place in the Belgian coal industry*
During 1959 and 1960 the following collieries
dropped out of COBSCHAR: Charhonnages Liabourg-Lie-se,
Charbonnagos do Helchtoren et ^eloar, Society Anon;.
des Ch sn&agaa de Senrlngen; and in I960, Charbon-
nages Reunia de Roten-F&reiennes et Oirnies^Aiseau
146
followed suit* These firrjg formed an independent
filing group and 3Gt their coal prices bolow COBA'GHAR.
The waiting period ran out, and COBAGHAR had not
resubmitted its application to the High Authority*
The High Authority, therefore, extended 0Q3ECEAR*3
authorization to continue as before until 31 Jan*
147
uary*
In February 1960 further changes wore nade rela-
ting to joint soiling through COBBCIIAB, because COBS-
CHAR no longer represented all the collieries*
By December 1960 the application was submitted
145* iUghth General Report ,, op * cit*, p* 188,




requesting authorization under Article G5 for the re-
grouping of the Belgian collieries within CCBECHAR
with the exception of the Socicte Anonyms ces Gharbo*
nages cu Basarc, Socie' mc dee
'
onnages
Reu.nios do Roier.-Farclor.ri3s at Oignies-Aiseau, and the
Wintorslag division of Socle le Anonpw s.llur^ic
d'Cspercnce-La: gdez. C [Aft i.l: c sired for authority
148
to amend their own operating rules* By 1 January
1951, nine of the twelve cc"Pier-5.6s, inc" I g the lar-
gest, had ro joined C
tgfc Authority Pec is I on l/CZ of 16 January 1963
authorised C(jt:-,CEAB fee ooorrto for the period 1 Feb-
149
rusry 1965 to 51 December 1P65. In its dealings*
GOBECHAR must ©bide by the requirements of the reor-
ganisation program* Five coal producers still remain
outside cf the sales agency as independents* Some of
the firms associated with COBSCHAR have also set aside
some of their production for their otm use and onsn in-
dependent sale s * Consequently, COEECHAR now has only
150
a very small part cf the Community coal market*
Pr odu c t i on Costs * Coal production costs are
greatly influenced by the natural conditions that
148* Ninth general Report , op* cit.» P* 170*
149« Eleventh GeneralReport fl op * cit *» p* 316*




prevail* The depth of the seam and its other charac-
teristics determine the mining methods to be used and
the capital and other costs required* fhen these
natural conditions are adverse, ;a nr supsxi*
sive mining situation - one which can. be offset only
by aachaniaati on *
A oorron marfeet offers two choices to a bi^h
cost producer* He may either opt to close down his
less efficient pits, or unc'artaJre a re-equipment Slid
modernisation program to increase the efficiency arc*
whittle &&m production costs.
The Belgian collierlea did both* First they
concentrated on F.oderniyation.i closing the least ef-
ficient pits, but keeping the border-line pits in oper-
ation because of the demand for coal* When the coal
recession set in, a program of reorganization and moder-
nization began in earnest*
In the Campine coal is produced from richer seams
on terms comparable with the better Community producers*
In the south the seams are thin and the production costs
are extremely hign*
Although productivity - measured in 0*M«S# • has
shown a steady increase since the beginning of the
Common Market for coal? production costs have also
climbed* In 1661* the Increase in production costs
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witbin the Community were so high that they cancelled
out the prict> reactions which nad been uade in the
previous two years* Most ttf the Belgian coal pi- lees
remux.iviJ raii-iy ij^^aay daring tola period showing
Blight increases lor suae grades la 1JCG.
£ho i-xvi'oa^ in * i i.iu inuireei, labo* 30s fed
nave been fchs ^riaoipal racier I 13 x-ise 01 prou^e-
sosfes* _/abor costs account Tor 55 percent or
151
the total pr-oducuion cosos p«a lined*
raose wages increased iaster than bid D#H«S, bLuu .
19o3 wage oos^s lucrea. .oru t;*an 70 percent; whoro-
as Q«M«S« increased only G5 percent In -Dolgiuni.
o-ae rising costs of mining •equipment, although
increasing at a modest Pat about 2 paroti rt yar
annua, also had a slight erioet on production costs.
as she ueraand Tor coal continues to decline,
and wages continue to increase* production costs will
probably continue uo rise.
Labor Goats . I'radiuionally, the salaries o;r
coal miners have been based not on hours put In at the
collieries, but rather on a piece-raoe system. The
reasons for this are cwo-fold. In the fir^t place,
the conditions in a coal raine are not- conceive to




management keeping a supervisory eye on its helps &i^
secondly* miners approach their work with varying
degrees of enthusiasm . •• ergo the output can differ
markedly from man to man. As a result, it has become
the custom to pay according to the amount of work
accomplished* The unit used in calculating wages under
the piece-rate system is either the weight of tubs
of coal excavated from the pit? or, the "measurement
of the coal extracted by length of face, area, or
cubic content. ..in the seam being workedj" or a com-
bination of tubs extracted and face worked, A fourth
generally used contract employs n timew as its unit
of measurement. The object here is to finish a given
152
unit of work within a given space of time.
A systematic classification of Belgian coal
workers was carried out in 1946 to compare wages and
skills and to coordinate wages. Fifteen standards
of wage rates • five surface and ten underground •
were developed based on the cost of living index* The
top three grades of underground workers were paid on
piece-rates, whereas the tenth grade was "subject to a
minimum guaranteed weekly wage."
A minimum wage rule operates for piece-rate




workers^ when for some unforeseen reason^ not under
his control^, the underground worker cannot meet his
155
quota*
It Is a basic tenet of the iSCSC Treaty that
"reductions of wages must not be used as a means of
competition between enterprises; on the contrary* the
object of the Common Market must be to raise the wor-
154
ker's standard of living,*1
Wages and indirect labor costs have shown a con-
tinual increase since the beginning of the Common
Market
In 1956$ labor costs in southern Belgium amount**
ed to ^9,60 per ton which were the highest In the Commu-
nity* The lowest* in the Loraine^ was #6*20 per ton*
The Campine labor costs per ton compared favorably
155
with those in the Lorraine*
Labor unions in the coal industry have not spent
their efforts on increasing direct wages to the labor
force* Rather* their focus of attention has been on
"safeguards against unemployment
»
w guarantees of week-
156
ly wages, and other social benefits*
153* Ibid* 3 pp* 87-88*
154. LICSC, xhird General Report on the Activities
of the Community (Luxembourg, 1955)3 p* T^3
«
155* Lister^ ££• oit *, p. 97*




TREND IN EMPLOYER'S WAGE CQ3TS A: , g '.(ATM) CHARGES (BELGIUM)
(1354 ~ ICO)




Year 1954 - 100 YearCkasige 1954 - 100 Year Change
1954 100.0 « 100.0 *#
1956 103.7 +3.7 110.3 +10.3
1956 110.5 +6.6 114.8 +4.1
1957 132 a.- +19.3 137.5 +19.8
1958 137.2 +3.8 141.8 +3.1
1959 135.3 -1.4 142.5 +0.5
1960 138.8 +2.6 152.1 +6.7
1961 143.9 +3.7 1Q6.5 +9.5
i'he Indirect payments to labor are those payments
which the employer makes to the state or to the private
funds for such items as insurance* retirement, un-
employment* sickness* family allowance* and so forth.
These are included in the cost of production* and do
not go directly into the workers 1 pockets* Indirect
payments may be considered as "special" costs need®6
to maintain the standard of living of the coal labor
force in relation to the standards of the Community*
In 1961* fringe benefits amounted to 34 percent
158
of the total wage of the average Belgian miner*
Table 19 shows the trend in 5-ndirect labor costs as
compared to wages*
157* ISlavent fa General Report j op . cit * a p* 106,
3-58* Labor in the European Community (No* 2*
Washington* D*C«s information Service of the European
Community* February 1964)* pp. 3-4*
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The Belgians pay higher allowances to Harried
men with children* These family allowances are highest
in Belgium and France* In Belgium, social security
159
payments are the same for all workers.
When the coal crisis set in, short-time working
was used to keep production and unemployment down and
as many pits in operation as possible. The regnla-
tions regarding allowances to miners on short-time
work were provisionally amended by decree in Belgium
in September 1958. The decreo stated that allowances
could be paid even when unemployment was limited to
160
one day.
By 1960s short-time working amounted to only
10 - 15 percent of production in Belgium. High Author-
ity Decision No. 2/60 of 27 January 1960 authorised
short-time working allowances from January to Sep-
tember 1960 amounting to $E#9 million*
On 10 January, the High Authority authorised
payments to continue through 1961. The High Authority
161
earmarked #1«3 million for these payments.
In 1961 and 1962, wages continued their upward
spiral - especially the indirect labor costs as a re-
159. Lister, og» cit .j pp. 586-58S.
160. Seventh 'General Report , op . eit., p. 242.
161. Mhth teeneraTl?oport , op. cjJTT PP» 257-258,
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suit of increases In social security payments*
Increases in wages and indirect payments continu-
ed to chip away at profits* until in 1963 it became
necessary to increase prices for some grades of coal.
Price Policies* At the end of World War IT,
the Belgian coal industry was in disarray. The Bel*
gian government moved in to fix prices* Most of
the export prices for coal were higher than those in
the domestic market. Cheaper coal importi from Ger-
many were sold in Belgium at domestic prices. The
difference In price was used to subsidize the coal
mines. There was, however, no official price controls
162
on coke.
When the Common Market for coal begun In 1955,
the control of prices passed from the hands of the
Belgian government to the High Authority. The High
Authority clamped the lid on the Community prices to pre**
vent them from rising too high now that they were free
of governmental control. In April 1954, the High
Authority decided to continue price controls for Bel*
glan coal primarily in conjunction with the subsidy
scheme. These subsides, paid under the Convention
162. Hate^i oj2. oit .,, , 285-286 J First General
Report * op , clt .» p. 67.
IS 9 *

were designed to bring Belgian coal prices down to
a more normal levels and as close as possible to the
prices of Kuhr coal* Controls on Belgian coal prices
continued until the end of the transitional period
in 1958.
In 1952, Belgian coal prices were consider bly
higher than Ruhr coal by the following percentages
I
anthracite « 32 percent? semi-bituminous - 48 percent?
and bituminous * 32 percent. German prices for coal
had been increased just before the opening of the
Common Market for co 1 on 10 February 1953* This help*
ed to make less glaring the differences in prices with
1G3
Belgian coal»
..he Convention called for the reduction of Bel-
gian coal prices, rhe iiigh Authority and the Belgian
government agreed on a deficiency payment system in
which Belgian coal prices were reduced and the produc-
ers were paid Bfr 29 per ton produced to cushion the
loss in revenue. This system was introduced on 15
March 1953.
In its Decision Wo. 6/53 on March 1953, the High
Authority took control of the fixing of maximum prices
on coal.
163* Meade, c£. cit .« pp. 292-293.
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In so doiny, it took Into account* as
far as possible, the existing prices
allowed a certain amount of ri6x5J:;Ility3
le firms fee s them*-
selves I«ih had
arisen thpouj I .ablishmoat of the
Ctta&ori Market*.
«
I t -oh must
not bo exceeded* wore fixed for eaeh
category of coal*1®4
Category is usually defined by the amount iC
volatile matter in the coalf whereas, grac© usually
refers ti each category bj Its sise« Coke re' ore to
eleven coke* Coal, in the iiurop^aii sense, means
hard coal and includes both anthracite and bituminous*
165
but not lignite*
.he High Author! fejf*§ new price list was issued
on 15 March 19SS* Only maximum prices were fixed,
find these were based on the previous government
controlled price** Bmtgltm coal under this price
schedule was still higher than the delivery price
of Ruhr coal, but only b? the following percentage a J
anthracite • 21 percent? seml*»bltuaincus * 20 pare ntf
1G6
and bituminous •• IS percent.
hen the Community opened shop, the Belgian
collieries had a surplus of coal, and exports were in
excess of imports * As long as the demand for coal
16o« aid,
.££* jsJJi»» P« lxfl»
166, Lister, ££, ci^»^ p« 285*
~ 151

continued* there were markets for the higher priced
Belgian coal* Subsidies played an important role in
making Belgian coal pricoa more competitive^
As v:a.a;es increased, production costs increased.
It was inevitable that coal prices would have to fol-
low suit, Table 20 illustrates the
.
evelepment of
Belgian coal prices for various grades as compared
to Ruhr coal*
After considerable dickering> between 1954 and
1956, the Hiqh Authority finally brought to an end
167
price-fixing except for Belgian coal in 1956*
In October 1957, the High Authority permitted
an increase In Belgian coal prices to allow for high-
er wages and social security payments which came
into effect in 1956* These new price increases were
applicable only to southern Belgium, and amounted to
2 to 4 percent depending on the grade of coal*
During the winter of 1957-1958, the demand for
coal fell* Coal prices were slashed, with those in
the Campine falling faster than those in the south.
The Belgian government stepped in to prevent further
cuts in order to protect the southern coal nines from
168
collapse*
167, DIebold, oj>. jciU, p. 599.




DEVELOPMENT OF COAL PRICES 108









































































































































Taxes to be added (percent)





























































































When the transitional period drew to a close,
i elgian coal prices were still above Ruhr delivery
prices by the following percentages* anthracite *
35 percent* semi-bituminous - 25 percent; and bitumi-
nous - 19 percent, ^-'bese figures indicate a much
better position as compared to the 1952 prices, but
a disappointment when comp nr»ed to the 1953 prices*
The primary cause behind these higher prices was the
increase in wa^es and other fringe benefits in order
170
to a .tract and keep worker?; In the industry*
3ome of the brighter aspects of the transitional
period wore he closing down of many unprofitable pits
in the southern Belg asin, the increased pro-
duction in the Campine, and actual shif ado from
high*cost to lower-cost pr--jouetioru £'hese develop-
ments* iiowever*. were not enough to turn the tide and
bring the Industry up to a more competitive position*
Before .going on to the post-transitional period,
a little ''light be mentioned about freight absorption
and zonal pricing* In 1953, the High Authority for-
bade the use of freight absorption by coal producers
on sales from another basing point within, the Communis
ty* this was to prevent the disturbance of the coal
-*—**! Jill 1^11




supply at each producing dl#ts*i#t4i Freight absorption,
171
however, was authorise:' on third country Import?,
r ~ m
prices for coal, h-owevor,, situatlos
is le s s B tr r. Igh tf opt- t d . c- t srm at-
fords a natural protective barrier be-
cause transport ebarges form a large
part of the delivery price except for
consumers in the vicinity of the pitheads*
and the sales of the basing for which
higher maximum prices have been set do
not necessarily depend upon the inability
of the mines whose price a are subject to a
lower limit to expand ly# *-*%
lgium was th. f country that would be offoot*
ed by the removal of f r .=sorption from coal
prices* Consequently* they ?,rere understandably cool
to the decision forbidding the practice.
Under Section 24 of the Convention, the High AU*
thority was authorised " '.o allow the charging of 3one*
delivered prices for coal to avoid sudden and harmful
shifts in productions or in certain areas, price
increases so steep and sudden as to be harmful." Eonal
prices - pricing based on the geographic location of
the consumer area - were therefore authorized during
:nal period in respect to salea by tb«
Belgian coking-plants within Belgium, to the French
depots of | lie and Meurth.o-et-Moselle, and to
171* Lister* o£» cl,.-
r
» j 9* 28V #





in 1958, vthem the aonal price- unatcd, the
problem of alio- sorption onco move faced
the High Authority. "In 1 Aer 11 1958, the 4igh Authority
-tted " a United degree of po^ntial freight
ab orpoin.ru ?? it the same tine, it sought to present
producers and sales ftgeneiea from fixiep- pple=ea on
the market outside their mm KINMMM **tiiltNtd freight
absorption was allowed by any coal district on not
p* than 20 percent ">f the previous year ? s total
sales of eoa.i» Even with these measures, duhr coal
still could have undersold Belgian coal on the -;alr;*an
auaition, this freight absorption did not
improve Belgium 1 a competitive position on the export
174
market*
W price schedules were subr.il t to 1 by C JB.tChAR
in December- 1958* showed cuts of .A'r 35 to
Bfr 75 depend ,lng on th coal* The three
Ca- "'.sea which withorew from Q AtUaR in
1958 published their schedules on 1 January 19-~j9«
iheir prices were r than the $i acy's
r 85 to Bfr 130)*
173. il Report* Vol, II, oo,
Cij»{ p # '»








.rd until 1962, m 39 es
to resume an upv/ard ell •» 1 April 1962* prices on
household gr$ " s J " '
nree- In* ">ade were -' oread
throughout the Communis v.
On 1 December 1962, prices vev creased 5 to
Broe: ' most types of coal, '.' .. ' 0M ^Iso
made at &hlfi time in Belg 9 ash - ^md moisture «
content standards for coal which had the ei: of
rai " rices on n \ s slurries, and
untreated duffs by 5 to 20 percent*
The United States Is the loading exporter of
coal to Eol;:iuu. Alt' aantlty of coal imported
from the United States has decreased considerably,
the lower prices of --•"'. 80a2 an *£l .he
Lan economy* " 81 shows ti -olopment of
American coal prices* is expected that by 1970
rican coal pri; U I around $13 - &13*8© per
metric ton for i coal 14 # 50 to $16*80 for
175
cok oal*
Although prices did increase in Belgium, the story




PRICE OF U.S. COAL (Slack/Coking Finoa) ita
($. per jaetric ton )


































































































March 9.84 3.17 13.01
(1) Average quarterly prico for short term contracts,
(2) Mean between maximum and miniiaum rates charged during the
month in respect to single voyages,
ARA » Amsterdam — Rotterdam - Antwerp.
176. Eleventh General Report , op . cit .» p. 608.
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coal prices will o
VII. T.
Lab or ?r ob1 on3 «
s
1 -elglan coal industry has
had its share of labor woes* In tfee boowing economy
that followed the war, the availability of pleas.inter
•loyment above grou | histries has wooed
potential miners away fron the gloomy, haaar clous $
1
3 curtailments of coal production, pit closures, Sate*
stability and quo- ible future of the coal Industry-
have further driven potential Belgian workers away.
1 when unemployment was high in Belgium, and there
was a need for workers in the pits, it was
difficult to get poople fee work in tine*,
yviobold (feaerlbetf '' situation thusJ
It seoms to be a law of rcodern economics
that prosperity makes it hard to mine coal
»» .Families that hate lived for •generations
with coal dust, cave-ins, silicosis* and
explosions see the chance to I _• the ir
30ns to a bettor future above ground**"7
*
7
Despite this, a3 recently as 1959, one out of
177, lebeld* on* «i£*i p. 446.
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every ten members of the B*lgl&a labor force wag «:<"<=»
f?:aged in the coal Industry* Coal presetion r»Ar>reri«n'b«»
178
ed 12 percent of 'oduG#d^
The only way that the Belgian collieries could
get sufficient workers in lines was %9 bir© foreign
labor » which helped keao the labor force up to the
clesired level* The problems that ensued frees the use
of .foreigners are discussed in the next section*
In 1952, there VMM 119*400 underground workers
employed in the Belgian coal industry* Although this
force was almost 15,000 ' p than in 1936* Q*M*S«
179
did not roach the 1938 level*
ihe miners In Belgium worked eight hour shifts
including winding time and were paid 25 percent bonus
for the first two hours of overtime, and 50 percent
bonus for any time over that. There were no fixed.
number of working days*
During the transitional period, there was a steady
demand for labor* Manpower shortages hampered efforts
to meet production goals* This was a contributing
factor to she necessity of importing large quantities
of coal*
ie recruitment ana stabilization of manpower
1?8 # Eighth Ganeral Report* og» j5ifc«» P« 152*
L
'
/ &* First Ctenoi-aX ugpur^ gjj* cit * 9 p» 57.




A op « cf¥** a PP* 37-38*
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picture improved in October 1956 with the onset of
wage increases* shorter working hours? and other
-inga benefits* 'i'here t new provisions for the
vocational tr. of Juveniles I adulta, Belgian
and non-Belgian* Si&ning-on bonr.se «j for nnew Belgian
entrants 11 were continued*
In 1957, the labor shortages abated* In June
1957, the Belgian government renewed efforts to amelio-
rate the social problems that existed in the industry.
A law was passed prohibiting employment of youths under
13 for underground work - with the exception of some
131
apprentices between the ages of 18 and 18*.
5>hort-tiuo working was introduced in the Belgian
coal nines in the beginning of 1958 in view of the
accumulated stocks and the coal recession* Recruit-
ment drives for underground workers virtually ground
to a halt* Many workers - principally the foreign
ones - were laid off*
After the transitional period, the labor force
in the Belgian coal industry diminished to such an
extent that by the end of 1962 } it stood at only 60
reent ef the 1957 level. Table 22 shows the trend
of th.3 labor force employed In the Belgian coal mines





'..fiSOKNEL EMPLOYED IN BELGIAN OOVL MINING ( »COO) 182
Year Workers Apprentices Salaried Employees Total
Dec. 1954 — 0.9 m 153.5
Dec. 1955 140.5 2.2 14.8 157.8
Dec. 1956 133.3 1.9 14.7 149. S
Sept* 1957 135.3 3.4 14.8 153.5
Sept, 1958 131.9 2.3 14.7 148. S
Sept. 1959 115,5 2.1 13.4 131.
C
Sept. 1960 97.1 1.3 11.7 110,6
Sept. 1961 S5.1 1.7 11.1 97.9
Sept. 1962 78,7 1.8 10.3 90.8
since 1954*
Implementation of Article 37 by the High Author-
ity in favor of Belgium in 1959 caused even more distur-
bances among the labor force as pits were scheduled for
closing, and the prospects of unemployment loomed ahead.
The Belgian government was duly concerned over
unemployment and the social disturbances that would
follow on its heels* Its inaction in reorganization
during the transitional period was primarily based
on this fear of unemployment*
Their fears were not unfounded* In February 1959
with the drop in coal production* short-time working^
and the possibilities of mine closures and unemploy-
ment* 100*000 miners struck in the Borinage district*
xheir protest ended up in rioting which was not eon-
182. Seventh General Report * op. cit .» p. 221f
Eighth General Report s op . cit., p* 280| Ninth general
Report j op . cit*» pp. 4&6-4WJ Tenth General Re port 3




trolled until police dragged out fire hoses and tear
183
gas. Demonstrations flared up elsewhere as well.
The gloomy atmosphere of the Borinage is not a
phenomenon of the twentieth century. A clear and vivid
description of the mining area was made almost a
century ago by the artist Vincent van Gogh* who lived
among the miners as an evangelist. In a letter to
his brother Theo, he said*
Most of the miners are thin and pale from
fever | they look tired and emaciated,
weather-beaten and aged before their time.
On the whole the women are faded and worn.
Around the mines are poor miner* s huts, a
few dead trees black from smoke* thorn hedges,
dungpiles, ash dumps, heaps of useless coal,
etc. 3.84
By the &n€i of 1959, short*time working was on
the wan© (see Table 8). It was even less prevalent in
I960, continuing to decrease thereafter.
Taking note of the unhappy situation of the wor«
kers, the High Authority (Decision No. 2/60 of 27
January 1960} authorized cojiim@ncei.ient of compensation
for short-time work in Belgium. Payments were again
authorized in 1961.
As less profitable mines were closed, an in-
183. "Oil Gomes In, Coal Piles Up", Business
Week (November 7, 1959), p. 128.
184. W. H. Auden, Van Gotqh : A Self-Portrait




creasing portion of the labor force deserted the coal
Industry* even though employment was available at
other pits*
Wages and benefits in the Belgian coal mines
remained high* but they were not incentive enough to
lure Belgians into the mines* However* it did attract
foreign laborers looking for quick money*
In 1961 , there waa again a shortage of under-
ground workers except in the Borinag© and Centre areas
where juveniles were being hired* By the end of Sep*
tember 1962, there were some 1600 job openings in the
185
Belgian coal mines which could not be filled.
Labor conditions in the coal mines have con-
tinued to improve. In 1962 , there were only 260 work
days in the Belgian mines* During the year 1961, ac-
tual incomes rose 4 to 5 percent. In 1955 miners worked
a gruelling 48-hour week. By 1963, they were moving
towards a 40-hour, five-day week. Vacations increased,
with additional days off given as a reward for efficiency,
Special social security coverage has also been
provided in addition to workers* insurance schemes
(accident benefits, old-age and death insurance, and
other compensations). The Belgian miners are also




receiving larger pensions as o.f 1958.
Despite the many improvements made, the Belgian
coal industry still holr-s little attraction for Bel-
gian nationals.
Foreign Labor Problems* During the transitional
period, there was a heavy concentration of denizen
workers imported to fill the void left in the coal
mining labor force by indifferent Belgians.
In 1957, the foreigners made up 48.6 percent of
the work force. (A curious upshot of this policy was
that in some areas of Belgium, Italians came to outv-
ie?
number the locals.) In 1962, their number dipped
slightly to 42 percent.
Of all the countries in the Community, Belgium
had the most trouble with its denizen workers. The
bulk of these men came to Belgium in pursuit of the
high wages being paid in the mines. They wanted to
work a few years and then return to their homelands.
They wore inexperienced. They showed little enthusiasm
over training programs; chiefly because they were
anxious to get to work as soon as possible as under-
ground workers so as to earn full pay. Ethnic dis-
crimination and language barriers added to the problems.
186* "Coal Miners Gain in Wages, Vacations, and
Social Securuty", European C ommunity (October 1963* No.
6G), p. 8.
1&*7* Business Week, ^pj). cit., p« 131.
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The labor turnover in the nines was high. Deni-
zen workers were the first to go whenever ther was a
outback or decline in employment* During trie coal reces*
sion of 1953-54, 6000 denizens were laid off in the Uel-
188
gian nines as compared to loss than 1000 Belgian**
Italians formed tho greater percentage of deni-
zen workers in 7 ium* At the end of 1962, they account*
ed for 26 percent of the labor force in 'uhe mines* The
movement of Italians into Belgium was governed by
bilateral agreements between the countries involved
and were concluded, before the CflBBaunlty came into
being* Meat of these workers wore recruited through
the Italian Ministry of Labor* The first agreement
was signed in 1946* By the end of 1957, there were
46,200 Italian workers in the Belgian coal industry*
This figure was almost halved by 1962 when only
189
24,300 remained*
The Italian labor force was at the root of much
embarrassment for the Belgian government. The Italians
were willing to work long, oat little, and cut corners
to increase their earnings. Much of the health and
188. Lister, 0£. cit*, p. 599*
*89 » Sixth General ' Report j Vol. II, 0£* cit*,
p* 176| iuievenGh General Keport; * op* clt.j p* 158|
Diebold, o£. cit*, PP. 441, 445*
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safety problems that developed were of their own
doing. The bulk of the denizen workers were employed
In the kci.thcrn mines where the working conditions
wore poor for both health and safety. The Italian
government repeatedly voiced concern about these con-
ditions* Few improvements were made, however.
The inter-governmental quarrel came to a head
in February 1956, when the Italian government called
a halt to the emigration of Italians to Belgium* In
August, the pit disaster at Marcinelle occurred in
which 296 miners were killed* One hundred of these
were Italians* Thereafter, the flow of Italian work-
ers was stopped not only in Belgium, but to the
remainder of the Community as well* until sueh times
as the working conditions in the coal mines were
190
improved.
As a result of the tragic Marcinelle incident,
the High Authority stt up the Mines Safety Commission*
Its function was to ensure that fche safety regulations
in the Community were kept up-to-date In accordance
191
with the most recent safety techniques.
At the end of 1957, the Italian government a-
greed to permit the resumption of emigration of workers
19°* ihld .a p. 444*
191. WEG 1962 , op. cit.» p. 25,
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if certain safety measures were carried out In the
mines by the end of 1958*
r
.th or without their government's blessings,
however, Italian workers continued going: to Belgium
to work in the coal mines* They c:Ireuravented the law
by going as tourists, working, and leaving the coal-
fields as soon as they had accumulated a nest egg*
The Belgian collieries succeeded In maintaining
the desired levels in their labor force in 1957 by a
continued recruitment program In foreign lands* By
the end of the year, they were employing 8000 Greeks,
192
3500 Spaniards, and 46,200 Italians.
Toward the end of 1957, when stocks were piling
up and cutbacks were the order of the day, Immigration
of foreign labor was stopped* From 1958 onward, the
position of the denizen workers was Indefinite* On July
51, 1959 the coal industry was barred from recruiting
additional foreign labor* During tfee first nine months
of 1961 alone, 5700 denizens were droopedf of whom
193
3700 were Italians*
During 1961* * $ 59 permits were issued by
the High Authority for Corr.nnity workers to enter
194
Belgium and work In the mines*
192 • SlEtji General Report, Vol II, ©g. cit , p. 176*
3-95 » 1'ent'a' General %'e ported op* cit*,» p* 410*
194 • |^v;enth General Report , op* oil;*, p# 426*




.XDGWN OF ",iTI N.ILIT[ 3TEB IN
1063 (rmi ;'„ ' '•»;1, AT CCES ajid ctiaIICAX,
CHNiCAL JIND M\NAG4HIAL STAFF )(• 000)
German
T'Miiaen : or':-ors
l»utchNationals Freaeh Italians Ooramunity




African Pules Greeks Others Total
2.5 O.S 3.1 2.1 2.7 38.7
Sy 1962, the Belgian government lifted the ban
on immigration or workers. Recruiting of denizen mine
workers resumed* During the first nine months of 1962 s
4715 new immigrant labor permits were issued - 1053 to
Italians, 2071 to Germans, and 1537 to Spaniards.
-able 23 shows the distribution of denizen wor-
kers in the Belgian coal mining industry at the end of
1962.
With mine workers once again in short supply in
Belgium, there will probably be a t.rend towards a con-
tinuation oi' high immigration of denizen workers* Bel-
gian industrialists hope to employ about 50,000 Turkish
workers by the end of 1963 • About 3000 Turks are now
employed in the Belgian coal mines, and it is expected
1S5 « g>j-^ *j P* G53*




thai; 200 more will jo : - Up ranks shortly
Readaption . It seemed Inevitable that unemploy-
ment and social distress would follow In the wake of
pit closures. Anticipating this, Section 23 of the
Convention authorises the High Authority to assist
in the readaption of workers. Readaption. in a
nutshell* is "everything that is needed to ensure
a smooth passage from one job to another; tiding-
over allowances* resettlement, retraining*"
'ihe High Authority set aside funds in order to
cope with the problem of unemployment when it arose.
At the beginning, although many miners were laid
off due to pit closures, they were quickly hired by
other mines, because of the shortage of mine workers.
Despite the fact that Bfr 70 million was set aside
by the High Authority in 1954 for readaption purposes*
it was not touched until 1 February 1958 when 60
199
Belgian coal workers received assistance.
During 1958, tho Belgian government set up a
commission of government representatives, labor, and
197. "Belgium to Hire Iv'.ore i'urks", Washington
Post (26 October 1965).
I98 * -;csc 1,962, op . olt>» p. 7.




employer representatives to assist *« la roa^wtion.
ieh assistance included the promulgation of detailed
200
ins true tl one on r.. ' its*
On 10 February 1868, the High Authority prized
roadaptlon i'mdr* for Belgium until 1900; > wever,each
application node by a colliery had to bo r - '.tea by
201
government end approved by the Council of I"ii<Isters*
Under this reetdaption program, t s " a ;~over
allowances were paid ar fo Iotts:
-• Fpv unempl oyner.it
:
(a) 100 percent cf ngoi previously earned
for the first four months
*
(b) 30 percent for the next four months.
(o) 60 percent for the final and last four
months*
2. During retraining or re-employment, the "net
wage is guaranteed ... for the twelve months fallowing
202
discharge."
By 31 December 1958, the High Authority had made
readaption credits amounting to §2.12 million available
to the Belgian coal industry* However, only #40,000
was needed* Six collieries had been authorised
200. Ibid,, p. 191.
2ui* seventh general Keport, o£. elt*i p. 23.





In 1989, eight more collieries were granted re-
204
adaption funds* In that year, the Belgian govern-
ment requested additional readaption aid. Funds were
approved by the High Authority contingent upon the
government 1 s promise that it would continue reorgani-
zation and prohibit further recruitment* By the end
of October, 11,000 workers were laid off, but most of
205
these f ound new work*
On 26 January 1960, |3 million was approved for
continuation of the special assistance scheme* This
assistance called for the payment of 20 percent of
the daily wage to the miners after the second day of
short- time work within any month* The maximum number
of days it was to be paid on was fixed according to
a descending scale {8 days for January and February,
7 days for March and April, etc* 5 until 30 September
206
1960.
Readaption had assisted 28,900 workers by the
end of 1960 in Belgium* Despite the increased number of
closures, underground workers found new jobs rapidly*
203. Ibid., P. 303.
204. eighth General Report , op* cit * 3 p. 282,
205. Ibid *, p* 286.
206. I'bld., pp. 132-133*
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In September* 1000 underground and 1500 surface
207
workers were still registered as unemployed.
An additional 6000 workers were laid off in 1961
as a result of elevel pit closures. Due to the need
for workers at other pits* most of these workers were
re-employed* By the end of September* only 1400
208
coal workers were unemployed*
From 1 February 1962 to 31 January 1963* three
readaption decisions were approved* These funds a-
mounted to ;. 470,000 and aided 3*150 workers* During
this period there was once more an increase in demand
for mine workers* All the underground workers found
work* "hose surface workers that could not find work
209
were retrained for jobs elsewhere*
It became apparent in 1959 that readaption alone
was not the answer* Redevelopment programs had to
be introduced to work along with readaption in coping
with unemployment*
Workers in depressed areas often were
reluctant to leave their I' fcnes and accept
new Jobs - even at higher rates of pay*
This retlcense to move was particularly
evident during the Belgian coal crisis
of 1961-62 when inefficient mines were
20*7* Kinth General Heport 5 jog. cit* 9 p. 274*
208* TentE General Report* ©£• cit*» p* 427*




closed in the southern part of the country*
These workers demanded redevelopment projects
which would create new jobs in the same areas*^*-
Charles Muller, the Economic Counselor to the
Belgian embassy in Washington, I.'•(.-• recently told this
writer that the readaption program in Belgium does
not primarily affect the indigenous coal miners* Since
the Belgians do not want to work in the mines* anyway,
a large percentage of those affected by pit closures
are now foreigners* A large number of the miners
being readapted are* therefore* not Belgians* but those
denizen workers who have moved to Belgium to live
and to work in the mines*
The chief problem* Mr* Muller pointed out, once
the pits have closed down is the need to sustain the
local economic interests which have earned their
livelihood from the coal miners* It is not enough
to retrain workers for other industires elsewhere*
ft
Some new industries must come into the areas*
During 1957 the Belgian government passed legis-
lation to aid in the buildup of new industries in areas
that were insufficiently developed* The Borinage*
Centre* and parts of the Liege districts were included
210* Labor in the European Community (Ho* 5.
Washington* D.C» Information Service of the European
Community* April, 1964), p. 2.
*• The interview took place on 24 May 1964*
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In the program. The Council of I'-iinlstere and .he High
authority also decide.; to examine the possibilities
of their lending a hand with redevelopment in these
critical areas.
An Intergovernmental Conference was set up in
1959 to discuss redevelopment possibilities. In all,
160 delegates from the Community and the United King**
211
dom were present.
She High uthority took action under Article 56
of the Treaty (which authorises financial assist nee
for redevelopment) to commence work along the lines
suggested by the Conference report, .his action took
three directions!
1. Redevelopment of areas affected by pit
closures.
2. ivew redevelopment operations.
212
3. i»ew studies.
By 1963, the High Authority had granted loans
for the development of four new industries in the
i orinage and the Liege districts.
In 1961, iron ana steel concerns of Belgium
decided to build a new galvanizing line in the Lie
which would provide 470 new jobs. The Liege Societe
Frovinciala d f Industrialisation was established on
211. :*lnth General Heport s op . clt . » :>p« 282,204.
212. Eleventh Goneral Ho port a o p . c 1
1
» <, o » 44<-»
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17 February 1961 as a "joint public/private intercom-
mand corporation" for economic expansion and develop-
ment in Liege. Its initial undertakings were expected
213
to make 4000 nev; jobs.
Vbm Societs Aleurope received a lo;jn on
February 19G2 from the High Authority for the purpose
of building an aluminum factory at Ghlin-Baudour in
the Borinago v.o be operational in 1965* It would
provide jobs for from 500 to 750 workers* of whom 15
to 20 percent were to be women* Mine workers were
to have first crack at these jobs*
On 22 November 1962 9 another loan was granted
to the Soeiete rirelli-Sacic to build a rubber goods
factory in Qhlln-Baudour, which would provide an
additional 500 to 600 ne?/ jobs, of which 15 percent
214
would be for women*
By the time these new projects are operational,
the problem of unemployment in the Liege and Borinago
areas should be solved* Some readaption aid will
certainly be necessary, Koadaption and redevelopment
will continue to work hand in hand to alleviate the
social problems in the Belgian coal fields*
213* ->.nuJ3 General Report * op. * cit * , p. 451*






I. IMPLICATIONS FOR BELGIUM
The prcphets of doom could paint a pretty-
gloomy picture of the future of coal in Belgium,
Ken don't want to work in the dine 84 -he seams are
thin, American coal Is cheaper. Oil from the Near
Last ejad /.frica r.nd gas from the Netherlands are
both blent iful and cheap* Atomic energy is on the
horizon.
But the truth Is that the coal industry in
.gittH is far from de d* After 10 years in EC SO •
during which time the High Authority and Belgian
government have used a variety of programs to prop
it up - the coal Industry la beginning to see the
light of day. ..he last of the marginal mines are
on the way out. KodemiZAtioii is the order of the
day In the remaining mines*
The Belgian government failed to give the
vigorous leadership : the post-war and transi-
tional periods that would have sparked the rehablli"
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tation program and put the 5.nduatry on a sure rooting
earlier*
After World V,ar II, Belgium was in a reason-
ably good financial position to improve the efficien-
cy oi' her high-cost mines and to make them more
competitive* i'he government's eyes were not dosed
to the situation, ihe government poured large sums
of money into the mines. Anxious to prevent meddl-
ing in private business, however, the government
did not manage or control these investments* They
let industry do it* And industry did not do it well*
The lar.;,e demand for coal gave the industry a false
sense of security* It put ofi until tomorrow that
which should have been done promptly*
ihe Germans could not be blamed for feeling
on the eve of the beginning of the Common Market
i or coal that the Belgian government should set its
own house in order, and chat it was not a job for
the Community*
ironically, Ihe Germans, who most opposed
the entry of Belgian high-cost coal into the Com-
munity, are now calling for subsidies and controls
on imports and investmenta "in the coal sector''
1
within the Community*
1* "German Unions Favor Coal Subsidies,"
Suropfcan Com--
.
unity ( -o* 55* September, 19G3), p* 16*
- 158 -

•en the coal crisis hit, rehabilitation and
recovery began la earnest with the government and
High Authority at the helm ensuring bbt te pre
would bo carried out. Strangely enough, even then
the Belgian government had to be prodded to go such
things as submitting subsidy requirements and ache: *
ules lor pit closures*
^lthot:*,: J. . slgl&n gove; . .t has yiewad
aiinity as a !1 headache* 1 , because or all the
labor problems that arose, it das also eonsidarg
it as a sing*
.< has gtvaa the I>el~
^ian government the iaaeufciv* to take charge and to
2
carr^ out a reorganisation program.
It may be significant* too, that
during the 1961 general election in
Lelgium, the eoun hose aeoncs
has perhaps most to fear from integ*
ration with its neighbors, and in
whose depressed coal mining area the
ISC is widely if unjustly blamed
for the closure of uneconomical pits*
no candidate c. than the Communists
denounced the European Community as
such! opposition sp. ... . . referred
to attack the Government for its alleg-
ed f ailure to prepare the Belgian ~
economy for ohe Common Market impact#°
Control of the Belgian collieries by the Bel-
2 # _ he interview with Ur« Charles
Muiier.
3« Riehard uayne, 'ihe Community of Europe
(i-ley York: . N orton and Company, Inc«, 1963), p» 14.
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gian government will probably continue* As st&bili
of labor and production in Belgium improve, it appears
certain that Belgian coal will be in an even more
competitive position*
Although the Belgian coal industry is in a
much better position than it was at the establishment
or the Common Market for coal, the future of Belgian
coal is dependent, as are the coal industries of the
other Community members, on the developments that
take place in other energy fields
•
i*lr» duller told this v^riter that the discovery
of such a large deposit of g&3 in the Netherlands has
completely changed the complexion of the future energy
picture in the Community* In his opinion, the Dutch
will try to sell this gas as quickly as pos ible at
a very cheap rate for the next 25 years. After that,
atomic energy will be much cheaper than even gas*
This gas field in the Netherlands is estiraa*
ted to be one of the largest in the world with 40
trillion cubic feet of gas. Although the Belgians
have just begun their ofr-shore search for gas,
.arcing to I.Ir* duller, taerc is a hope among tiki
stages bordering the North Sea that ail may also be
4* Howard 'Simons, "North Sea a Possible G-assar",





At preset, tin bt&te* •urop^an c-ynsunifcies *
teg - a"?- a mer
1 funoslons into a single Comrdu.ity.
theae no »n3 f of Cor I .do x,o
establish a c : vnw- -lloj ::-n* .
5
feg 1967. $tgvtl£4 fett&a be aocoeipl' * ths cu
one;- volley would co coin; <e flow ffi£ all fcfutfi
of an^r loufe 6 i <vlde I
modus ylvo^ol. b ; ff mid o«hor mi sources*
II. j;;pl2c;
ilgiua*a experience lis the SOSC has been
a mierocnsia of European unity. For aver 10 y**rt -
in rospoet • 1 In^uetrj* «ri loll &»• just
ret in i * • •l~iuRi baa ac^cd in concert.
with her na!ghbor*| Germany, ;'"rance f herl&ncs*
arid -.t&l;:. -ofos.t.or • ';ese fctfttWd la 1984g tn©
J uture 02: the &orlu«g« .Ld be n a tost for the* tni«*
tire activity 0$ the Cosr. . n
.c the , 2SCSC experiment in
y h&& , go fti tbe cr.use
5. "Six to i're. V _: Policy fOJP
:-7 ...orger," Europe
-..n Community (1 o. 71, ' :.-y, 1964)*
P« 14*
6. 1 » Olt«# >i 3*
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of a United 3 hat as of Europe been forwarded. If
L'arope with its spectrum of tongues and customs
can unite over the difficult coal market, the tra-
ms are clear that she can also unite over
she entire economic field.
ore specif y« if 1 ;itsa - with her
plethora of old Mines and inefficient equipment *
could make 1 e in the Camion. Market for coal,
it is not unreasonable to conclude that Germany
with her small, inefficient, highly subsidized
farms can make the grade in a Common Market for
iculture , even in the face of large French farm
surplus. Once the thorny agricultural question is
settled, perhaps the climate will c ght for
political integration* Then a United States of
rope will become a reality*
- ! economic union brought about by ECSC
has not worked miracles* It vgfl not expected to*
However, ir:.;er the ECSC's dir ., . ui
miners *• together with those of the rest of the
jnunity * a found an improved stand. $ liv-
ir,
. . The higl I n r;;l:.al Belgian mines which
have be<. oh a probl- hi .c v years
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have been phased out with a minimum of disorder and
social displacement,
ore has been some bitterness, of course*
In the wake of pit closures and resultant unemploy-
•nt in Belgian
t
ms have chafed more than
oe over the Sigh Authority^ dlrigisme. r-;'he High
Authority, in turn, has been exasperated by the
reluctance of bo h government and mine owners In
Belgium to move forward vigorously* But pro^r •«
has been consistent.
; Isp.gro '~s are not in themselves
etu 3 blocks to further economic and political
integration. (In a sense, the "states rights"
problems in the United States are analogous to the
"national interests*1 problems of Europe.)
French president Charles de Gaulle has set
up a roadblock ag-iinst further unification at this
time. His agricultural policies, his exclusion of
Britain from tho Omrnon -->et in 1965, and hia
insistence on a loosely confederated "Eurone of the
7
Paths- lands" have caused dissension among the Six.
opes for a federated Europe are dormant but not
dead. The Belgians continue to champion "full
.
'





flacked political Integration zg match economic in~
8
tegr ;tion."
ISxperiments in European federation have won
the endorsement of the nan in the street in Belgium*
A poll conducted in December 1962 which asked the
Belgians the question, ttAre you for or against the
efforts to unify Europe?*', received an affirmative
vote from 65 percent of those questioned, ®i those
polled, 42 percent thought that unification could foe
9
achieved in 10 or 15 years*
linen the SCSC I'reaty was signed, it wast
"...printed in Louis XIV type with
German ink on Dutch vellum" and "bound
in Belgian parchment... adorned with a
marker of Italian silk." 10
The signators hoped that this unity would be
more than symbolic. As the High Authority recently
asserted, "If the ECSG accomplishments are abandoned,




9, Ibid > 3 p. 296.
10. lians A. Schmitt^ ".he European Communities",
Current History (November 1965) p. 260.
"*11.
"EC SO Asks more Power in Merged Communities",
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1« It is agreed that new Belgian ooal productions
* shall not have to bear an annual reduction of more
than 3 percent as compared with the preceding year*
If the total production of the Community is the same
as or greater than that of the preceding year1 J or n
shall not be less than Belgian production during the
preceding year decreased by 3 percent, the figure thus
obtained being further reduced by the coefficient of
reduction suffered by the total production of the
Community as compared with the preceding year.
The High Authority* which is responsible for the
regular and stable supply of the Community's require-
ments, shall draw up long-term forecasts of production
and trade and, after consulting the Consultative
Committee and the Council, shall, as long as the Belgian
- 174 <*

market remains separate from the common market under
the provisions of para raph 3 below, address to the
Belgian Government recommendations on the shifts in
production which it considers possible on the basis
of such forecasts* Uith the agreement of the High
Authority* the Belgian Government shall decide what
steps are to be taken to bring about such shifts in
production within the limits specified above*
2* The compensation system is designed* start*
ing from the beginning of the transition periods
(a) to make it. possible to bring the price
of Belgian coal to all consumers In the common market
as close as possible to prices in the common market
generally* so as to reduce Belgian prices to a level
near that of the estimated costs of production at the
end of the transition period.
(b) to ensure that the Belgian steel industry
is not prevented by the special arrangement for Belgian
coal from joining the common market for steel, and
from lowering its prices for this purpose to the level
practised in this market.
^he High Authority shall periodically fix the
amount of the additional compensa.ion for Belgian coal
delivered to the Belgian steel Industry which it con-
siders necessary for this purpose, taking into account
175

all aspects of the running of this industry* la
doing so, the High Authority shall ensure that such
compensation does not hove harmful ©fleets on the steel
industries of neighboring countriee. Furthermore,
in view of the provisions of sub-paragraph (a) above*
such compensation must in no case lead to reducing
the price of the coke used by the Belgian steel- Indus*
try below the delivered price which it could obtain
if it were supplied with Ruhr coke.
(c) to grant additional compensation for such
exports of Belgian coal within the common market as
the High Authority may find to be necessary in view
of the prospects for production and requirements In
the Community as a whole} such compensation shall
correspond to 80 percent of the difference, to be
determined by the High Authority, between the deliver-
ed price (F.G.B. plus transport) of Belgian coal and
the delivered price of coal from the other countries
in the Community.
3* Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 9
of this Convention, the Belgian government may re-
tain or set up, under the control of the High Authority,
mechanisms making possible the separation of the
Belgian market from the common market.
- 176

Imports of coal from third countries shall foe
subject to the approval of the High Authority.
These special arrangements shall be ended as
describee below*
4* fx;he Belgian Government undertakes to abo-
lish the schema s described in paragraph 3 above not
later than the end of the transition period. After
consulting the Consultative Committee and with the
agreement of the Council* the High Authority may* not
more than twice, give the Belgian government an extra
year f s grace, if It finds that exceptional circum-
stances not now foreseeable render such a step
necessary*
fho integration of the Belgian coal market into
the common market which is thus provided for shall
take place after consultation between the Belgian
government and the High Authority, who shall jointly
determine the appropriate means and procedures*
Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-paragraph (c)
of Article 4, these procedures may allow the Belgian
government to grant subsidies which correspond to the
additi nal operating costs arisr out of the nature
of its coal deposits, and which take into account any
expenses resulting from manifest cisequillbria which
- vn

increase operating costs, -he procedures for grant*
ing such subsidies and their size shall be subject
to approval by the High Authority* which must ensure
that the amount of the subsidies and the tonnage
subsidized are reduced as quickly as possible* taking
accoiiiit of the facilities for re-adaption and of the
extension of the common market to products other than
coal and steal, while not allowing the size of decreases
in production to provoke fundamental disturbances in
the Belgian economy*
livery two years the High Authority must submit
to the Council for approval proposals relating to





arepeaa Coal and Steel Community
AHl'lCLE 3£*
If a member State considers that in a given
case an action of the High Authority, or a failure
to act, is of such a nature as to provoke fundament**
al and persistent disturbances In the economy of
the said State, it may bring the matter to tb@ at*
tention of the High Authority.
The High Authority, after consulting the
Council, shall if it is appropriate recognise the
existence of such a situation, and decide on the
measures to be taken, under the terms of the present
Treaty, to correct such a situation while at the same
time safeguarding the essential interests of the Corn*
munity*
¥ihen an appeal is lodged before the Court under
the provisions of this Article against such a decision
or against the explicit or tacit decision refusing
to recognize the existence of the situation mentioned




In case of annulment, the High Authority shall
decide, within the framework of the Court's judgment,
the measures to be taken to fulfil the objectives set
forth in the second paragraph of this article*
At the request of a member State or of the Sigh
Authority, the Court may annul the resolutions of
the Assembly or of the Council*
The request must be submitted within one month
from the publication of such a resolution of the As-
sembly or the notification of such a resolution of
the Council to the member States or to the High Auth-
ority*
Such an appeal may be made only on the grounds
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